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Blind Leading the "Colorblind:"
The Evisceration of Affirmative Action and
a Dream Still Deferred1
In the state of nature, men are in fact born equal; but they cannot
remain so. Society deprives them of equality, and they only become equal
again because of the laws."2
Like an incurable cancer, the disease of racism3 continues to plague the
population. This malady incessantly claims "victims" who, rather than
attempting to find a cure for it, fall prey to its venom and become enemies
amongst each other instead of allies. Nowhere is the abomination of racism
more clear and tragic than in the relationship between African Americans
and white Americans. Unfortunately, this strained relationship stubbornly
persists despite the demise of slavery, Jim Crow laws,5 and the enactment
of race-conscious remedial programs designed to curb the effects of racial
discrimination.
Those who believe society has finally moved beyond racism are greatly
mistaken. Racism has recently been manifested in a number of ways. First,
1. See Langston Hughes, Montage of a Dream Deferred,in THE COLLECTED POEMS
OF LANGSTON HUGHES 387, 388 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., 1994). A
"dream still deferred" is a phrase which evokes the purpose of the poem, which is to reflect
on the lifestyles of southern African Americans who migrated north to Harlem, New York,
after World War II. Many of these individuals confronted disappointed expectations. They
anticipated freedom but were met with racial adversity and frustration instead.
2. DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT vi (1991) (quoting CHARLES DE SECONDAT,
BARON DE MONTISQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748)).
3. The author uses "racism" to describe the conscious or subconscious belief that
one's race is superior to another race.
4. "Victims" refers to those who have truly suffered from racial discrimination, such
as non-whites, and those who are infected by racism such that they fail to understand its
dynamics and thus exhibit bigoted attitudes.
5. "Jim Crow laws" refersto the domineering system of racial segregation established
after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution were
mandated. Its purpose was to assure white domination over blacks. White Americans,
through Jim Crow, successfully implanted a widespread belief, both in the North and South,
that blacks were an inferior race and whites were superior. This provided justification to
racially segregate schools, hotels, theaters, etc. This occurred by law in the South and by fact
in the North. See Aldon Morris, CenturiesofBlackProtest:Its SignificanceforAmerica and
the World, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 19, 40-43 (Herbert Hill &
James E. Jones, Jr., eds., 1993) [hereinafter RACE IN AMERICA].
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resistance to school desegregation, which is sometimes racially motivated,

still abounds.6 Second, a slew of southern black church fires, perceived to
be arson-related and racially motivated, have occurred.7 Likewise, overt
racist behavior maintains a stronghold in the judicial and business realms.'
Additionally, the gross disparity between blacks and whites concerning the
acquittal of football star O.J. Simpson reveals a remarkable dichotomy in
attitudes toward the criminal justice system.9 Racism even appears to affect
the movie industry.'"

Sadly, reverberating throughout the nation and in spite of this

conglomerate of disparaging events, are frustrated cries that affirmative
action, l" especially race-based programs, is no longer necessary or should
be sharply curtailed.' 2 These affirmative action opponents have already
sought relief.'3
Furthermore, the judicial system has begun to quiet the opponents'
cries, effectively by using "strict scrutiny" as a standard of review to apply

to race-based affirmative action programs 4 which has resulted in their

6. See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., No. 89 C 20168, 1996 WL
364802, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1996), rev'd and remanded (to determine proper attorneys'
fees), 90 F.3d 1307 (1996).
7. See William Neikirk, Clinton, Governors Take Aim at Arson 'Fever,' CHI. TRIB.,
June 20, 1996, sec. 1, at 8.
8. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 149 (1996) (quoting In re Stevens, 645
P.2d 99, 99 (1982) (where concurring Justice Kaus referred to the racially derogatory
comments made by a censuredjudge about blacks)). Moreover, race remains a critical factor
in courtroom proceedings as it influences verdict determination, witness credibility, and
whether jury instructions are given to juries. Id. at 127.
9. Mark Whitaker, Whites v. Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 28.
10. Johnnie L. Roberts, Is Tinseltown Really Racist? Read On, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18,
1996, at 45.
11. Affirmative Action may be defined as "[p]ublic or private actions or programs
which provide or seek to provide opportunities or other benefits to persons on the basis of,
among other things, their membership in a specified group or groups." James E. Jones, Jr.,
The Rise and Fall ofAffirmativeAction, in RACE IN AMERICA 345, 345-46 (Herbert Hill &
James E. Jones, Jr., eds.), [hereinafter Jones, Rise and Fall].
12. See infra pages 31-36.
13. For instance, voters in California approved, 54 percent to 46 percent, a proposition
which prohibits race and gender-based Affirmative Action programs in college admissions,
contracting, and hiring. See Michelle Locke, Californians Take Affirmative-ActionMeasure
to Court, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at 8.
14. See Lino A. Graglia, Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adarand: Implications for the
Future of Race-Based Programs, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 287, 293 (Spring 1996); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
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elimination. However, the United States Supreme Court has yet to define
an appropriate standard of review for the context of higher education.' 5
This Comment explores the historic and current judicial treatment of
race-based remedial programs, particularly those affecting education. Part
I of this Comment provides an analysis of historic trends which concerned
Fourteenth Amendment interpretations and their application to school
desegregation decrees and affirmative action programs in higher education.
Part II assesses the current judicial reluctance to validate race-based
remedial action when no constitutional violation has occurred but the
segregative effects are caused instead by societal factors. This aversive
attitude has made race-based remedies increasingly difficult to implement.
Part II furthermore examines the progressive and unfriendly judicial posture
toward voluntary affirmative action where constitutional violations are
absent. Finally, Part HI reiterates the arguments of affirmative action
adversaries and supporters and recommends that, when the opportunity
arises, the United State Supreme Court should mandate a lesser standard of
review to apply to race-based remedial programs in higher education.
I. AN HIsToRICAL ANALYSIS: TRENDS UP To MIssouRi V. JENKINS
The Court has adopted an increasingly hostile view toward raceconscious remedial programs which include school desegregation and
affirmative action. Since this attitude concerns disregard of the elimination
of societal discrimination against African-Americans as a constitutional goal,
it resounds echoes of the "separate but equal" doctrine set forth in the
6
infamous case, Plessy v. Ferguson."
The phrase "equal protection under the laws"' 7 has been espoused by
fiery debate which has existed for generations." Particularly controversial

(1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
15. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299, 359 (1978).
16. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,states:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
18. See Eric Schnapper, Comment, AffirmativeAction and the Legislative History of
the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753, 754 (1985).
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is its application as support for race-based school desegregation and
affirmative action programs 9 which originated in the late 1800s.2 °
A.

ENACTMENT AND EARLY INTERPRETATION
AMENDMENT TO 1896

OF THE FOURTEENTH

Subsequent to President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of
18622 1 and prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
passionately argued over what kinds of reparations should be made to the
newly freed slaves.22 What resulted was undoubtedly Congress' first
adoption of racial preferential treatment programs, namely the Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, otherwise known as the
Freedmen's Bureau.23 It was established in 1865 and was responsible for
taking possession of land seized from Confederate rebels under confiscation25
24
laws and leasing it to the freedmen. Inarguably, the power of the Bureau
was the means for blacks to finally obtain some independence and selfsufficiency.26
Despite the benefits blacks incurred from it, legislation concerning the
Bureau was bitterly rejected and opposed by some, including Congressmen
and President Andrew Johnson. Such opposition seemed to increase as the
years progressed as well. 27 Additionally, Johnson felt that the unique
problems of blacks were already resolved.2" Johnson's antagonism toward
the Bureau was complemented by Congressmen who failed to understand the

19. Although Affirmative Action concerns various areas, such as employment and
subcontracting, this comment will primarily focus on education.
20. See Carl E. Brody, Jr., Comment, A HistoricalReview of AffirmativeAction and
the Interpretationofits LegislativeIntentby the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 294
(1996).
21. See NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 54-55.
22. Schnapper, supra note 18, at 756-57.
23. See James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and PresentStatus of AffirmativeAction in
Employment: Economic, Legal, and PoliticalRealities, 70 IOwA L. REv. 901, 904 (1985).
24. NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 60.
25. The Freedmen's Bureau was empowered by the 1865 and 1866 Freedmen's Bureau
Acts and additional legislation to not only provide land to blacks but also funds, food
supplies, and educational facilities. The latter included colleges and universities, such as
Howard University. See Schnapper, supra note 18, at 776, 781.
26. NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 58.
27. Schnapper, supra note 18, at 769-70. ("Congress... has never founded schools
for any class of our own people .... It has never deemed itself authorized to expend the
public money for the rent or purchase of homes for ... the white race who are honestly
) (quoting President Johnson explaining
toiling from day to day for their subsistence ....
his rationale for vetoing the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Bill).
28. Id. at 774.
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need for such programs.2 9 There was a fear instilled in such individuals
that whites would be unfairly harmed by such remedies.
To the contrary, proponents of the Freedmen's Bureau emphasized its
necessity in order to countervail the effects of slavery.3" What resulted
from the controversy was a simultaneous debate over the 1866 Freedmen's
Bureau Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,3 ' both of which were enacted primarily to ensure black freedom.32
Although the Bureau became insolvent in 1870 and Congress did not
approve additional federal funding for it,33 the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 18683' which provided hope to those striving to compensate
blacks for the dehumanizing and inexpiable harms they suffered as a result
of slavery.
The Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases reiterated the intent
of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court heard the argument of
butchers who challenged a Louisiana statute on the grounds that it allegedly
established a monopoly and thus deprived a class of citizens of their right
to exercise their trade.3 6 The Court rejected the Plaintiffs' contentions that
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
were denied.37 It reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause, in consideration of the history of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, clearly has a remedial purpose, that is, to prohibit state laws which
discriminated against the newly freed blacks.3" Furthermore, the Court
stated that the provision obviously pertained to that race and that urgency
and a strong case would be essential for it to apply to some other race.39
Nevertheless, in 1896 the Supreme Court chose to interpret the Equal
Protection clause in a memorable way, the impact of which would have
distressing and lasting consequences. This unforgettable case was Plessy v.
Ferguson.40 Plessy concerned a Louisiana law which prohibited "colored
persons" and whites from riding together in the same railway compartments

29.
exclusion
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 776-77 (referring to the dissent of Congressmen who disfavored the
of whites from a bureau's program crafted to provide food and aid to blacks).
Brody, supra note 20, at 294.
Id. at 296.
See NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 66; see also BRODY, supra note 20, at 296.
Schnapper, supra note 18, at 783.
NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 66.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).

Id.at 60.
Id.at 81.
Id.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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unless a member of one race was caring for the children of a member of the
other race. Instead, the compartments were "separate but equal."' Plessy
attempted to justify its holding that the law was constitutional by asserting
that although the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to enforce "absolute
equality . . . before the law," it did not have the purpose of eliminating
distinctions between the races to achieve social equality. 2 Also, Plessy
stated it cannot be assumed that a legislature can "fix" social prejudices,
rather, social equality must be obtained through the "voluntary consent of
individuals."' 3
Additionally, the Court in Plessy reasoned that even though the civil or
political rights of no race may be constitutionally inferior, there is no
constitutional remedy for social inferiority. Therefore, the statute, by
providing "separate but equal" facilities, did not stamp the "colored race
with a badge of inferiority," and if any such badge existed it was only
because blacks chose to interpret it that way.44
Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter, prophesied that the Court's holding
would be as destructive as the Dred Scot v. Sanford decision which held that
slaves were not "citizens" under the Constitution. 4' He attacked the
majority's reasoning by arguing that the Constitution is "color blind" and the
statute in question contradicts its spirit and letter. 46 Despite the argument
that the statute does not racially discriminate, its obvious intent was to
exclude blacks from places at which whites were located. 47
Harlan's prophecy came true. Plessy in effect essentially licensed
states, both northern and southern, to continue treating blacks as second
class citizens. 48 "Separate but equal" was a concept utilized by various
states to expand Jim Crow laws 41 to areas other than passenger trains and
schools, such as hospitals, waiting rooms, and the use of "Jim Crow" Bibles

41. Id. at 540, 541.
42. Id. at 544.
43. Id. at 55 1.
44. Id.

45. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Dred Scot v. Sanford, 60 U.S.

393, 407 (1856), reaffirmed the acceptability of slavery and reinforced the concept of blacks
as inferior. It did this by stating the black man possessed no rights white men were bound

to respect.

46. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559, 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

47. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

48. It is interesting to note Plessy'sexclusiveapplication to blacks. Harlan mentioned
that although the Chinese, contrary to blacks, were not allowed to become United States
citizens, they nonetheless were not banned under the Louisiana statute from riding with

whites. Id. at 561.

49. See supra note 5.
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in courtrooms.5 0
Since African Americans were often intentionally
excluded from public graduate and professional schools, they were not
allowed opportunities to become, for example, doctors or lawyers."
"Separate but equal" in the field of public education finally came to its
demise when the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education
("Brown I.99)52
B.

JUDICIAL RACE BASED REMEDIES: APPLICATION TO

SCHOOL SEGREGATION

Brown I was a landmark case because it became the impetus for a
greater public acceptance of school integration.53 The plaintiffs in Brown
I were African-Americans who challenged the laws of four states which
permitted or mandated racial segregation in their public schools. 4 Brown
I held that these laws were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause and also discussed precedent which found that the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment which was primarily to protect blacks." Brown
I emphatically reasoned that "separate but equal" had no place in public
education and its effect was to give African-Americans an inferior status.5 6
This was particularly devastating in the area of education since it impeded
the child's development and motivation to learn and basically deprived black
children of opportunities to succeed in life." In sum, although the physical
facilities and other "tangible factors" may be equal between black and white
schools, such segregated institutions are "inherently unequal. 5 8
Despite Brown 's fundamental decision it remained inconclusive
regarding proper remedial decrees.5
Approximately one year later
however, the Court began to establish guidelines for implementing Brown

50. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 393 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 394.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. See Gary Orfield, School Desegregation After Two Generations, in RACE IN
AMERICA 234, 237, 240 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) (noting current

societal attitudes favoring school integration).

54. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486-87. The four states were Delaware, Kansas, South
Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
55. Id. at 490 & n.5 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67-72 (1872)). See
id. at 495.
56. Id. at 494, 495.
57. Id. at 493, 494.
58. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
59. Id. at 495-96.
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. Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown IT),6o noted that in order to
execute Brown I it is wise for district courts to appraise the efforts of
Defendant school authorities to comply, in good faith, with the constitutional
principles embodied in Brown .6 The Court reasoned that courts which

initially hear school segregation complaints can best judge the effectiveness

of remedial decrees due to their proximity to local conditions.62 In doing
so, those courts must develop decrees in an equitable manner by reconciling
public and private needs.63
However, courts were to require defendants to make "prompt and
reasonable start[s] toward full compliance" with Brown I and should
evaluate any plans proposed by defendants to carry out a transition to
racially nondiscriminatory school systems. During these transitions the
courts would reserve jurisdiction of the cases.64 Above all, district courts

were to enter decrees and orders which were necessary and proper to admit

black children in segregated systems to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with "all deliberate speed."6 5
The Supreme Court, in cases following Brown II, developed rules with
which school boards that perpetuate racial segregation derived from de
jure" segregation were to comply to remedy discrimination and its
effects.6 Various methods were suggested by parties of suits to achieve
60. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
61. Id. at 299-300.
62. Id. at 299.
63. Id. at 300.
64. Id. at 300-01.
65. Brown I, 349 U.S. at 301.
66. De jure segregation is that which is mandated by law. See United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1992).
67. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431, 437, 438 (1968) (holding that
Defendant school board's "freedom of choice" school plan was inadequate to effectuate a
transition from a dual segregated system to a unitary, nonracial system and that school boards
have an affirmative duty to take necessary steps to eliminate the discrimination "root and
branch"); see also Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14-16, 18 (1971) (asserting that
district courts are to use their flexible and broad equitable powers to evaluate whether school
boards have eliminated all vestiges of state-imposed segregation and those remedial powers
were to extend only to the constitutional violation when school officials have failed in their
affirmative duties. A prima facie case of such a violation occurs when it is possible to
identify a white or black school merely by referring to the racial composition of it if that
school is within a system known historically to be segregated); Keyes v. School Dist. No. I,
413 U.S. 189, 208, 214-15, 224-32 (1972) (reasoning that a finding of intentional segregation
in a significant part of a school system creates a presumption that other segregated schooling
within the system is also a result of that intent. Thus, the burden is on the defendant to
prove otherwise. Likewise, the difference between defacto and dejuresegregation is intent.
However, Justices Douglas and Powell believed the distinction between the two should be
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solutions and when they were insufficient in meeting those standards, the
lower federal courts had the authority to administer their own plans.6"
Although progress was made in desegregating schools, such efforts
nevertheless met fierce opposition.6 9 Busing was particularly controversial.70 The Supreme Court following Brown H restricted the scope of
desegregation decrees when societal factors were found to contribute to or
cause de facto7 1 segregation. 72 In fact, resegregation based not on state
abolished because there was no constitutional difference between them); see also United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992) (finding that a prior dual system is not
sufficiently dismantled by racially neutral university admissions policies).
68. Both plaintiffs, parents and children, and defendants, school officials and states,
as well as courts, recommended a plethora of ideas, such as student assignments through
racial quotas, Swann, 402 U.S. at 23; busing, id. at 29; zoning, Green, 391 U.S. at 441;
"magnet schools", Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 723 (1974) [hereinafter Millikenl]; and
remedial education, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 272 (1977) [hereinafter MillikenI1].
These alternatives have been utilized by numerous schools.
69. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
70. Flax v. Potts, 864 F.2d 1157, 1160, 1162 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
desegregation plan may be changed to eliminate busing in a school district which had not
achieved unitary status but was close to doing so). Furthermore, white suburbanites prompted
President Nixon to attempt to persuade Congress to prohibit busing. Orfield, supra note 53,
at 239-40.
71. Basically, defacto segregation may be defined as segregation in fact which is not
caused by legally permissible discrimination of state authorities. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 1718.
72. Milliken , 418 U.S. at 738 (determining that an interdistrict remedy for an
intradistrict violation is inequitable; rather, the nature of the violation should dictate the
remedy). In addition, district courts do not have the power nor may they implement remedies
for de facto segregation as doing so would interfere with the authority of local school
officials. Id. at 744. Justice Stewart concurred, arguing that the large number of blacks in
the city of Detroit was not clearly caused by the defendant state and school officials. They
may have been caused instead by "unknowable factors," like racial fears. Id. at 756 n.2
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall dissented, fearing that the
Court was reverting back to the Plessy "separate but equal" era. Id. at 759 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that precedent did not
proscribe utilization of an interdistrict remedy for an intra district violation. In fact, to him
the Court failed to restore the victims of discrimination to the position they would have had
absent that conduct and "white flight" would subsequently increase. Id. at 778-81 (White,
J., dissenting).
See also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976)
(declaring that although unitary status may not have been achieved within a segregated school
district, since a "racially neutral attendance plan" was established to remedy the constitutional
violation, the district court exceeded its authority in making annual adjustments to the racial
composition of student bodies because changing demographics attributed to the racial makeup
of the Pasadena schools rather than any past or present constitutional violation); Freedman
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992) (holding that a Georgia district court may withdraw
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action but on private choices through, for example, housing, do not have
constitutional implications. This restriction in scope means that courts have
no authority or ability to redress segregation resulting from societal
discrimination.7" Instead, there must be a nexus between desegregation
plans and actual constitutional violations which either originate from
segregation governed by law,74 or from facially neutral school policies
75
which nevertheless intentionally engender a dual school system.
Ironically, despite conjectured images of the South as the perpetrator
of racism, which brings to mind visions of the Ku Klux Klan, lynchings,
and Jim Crow, the South generally has been more successful than the North
in implementing desegregation decrees. The explanation for this may be
that segregation in Southern states was typically required by law and
therefore has been easier to identify. On the contrary, the Court has found
that segregation of Northern schools has commonly been aggravated not by
law or intent, but by de facto segregation.76
Although advocates of racially centered school desegregation plans
have confronted some societal ambivalence and outright defiance, the need
for race-based remedial programs has been recognized.77 Subsequently,
their application has been extended to higher education facilities by means
of preferential treatment programs.
C.

APPLICATION OF RACE, CONSCIOUS REMEDIAL MEASURES, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Following a similar logic used to justify race-conscious solutions to
school segregation, (to ameliorate the effects of actual racial discrimina-

judicial supervision over facets of its desegregation plan although the defendant school district
had not achieved unitary status with respect to all aspects of the plan).
73. Freedman, 503 U.S. at 495.
74. See, e.g., Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

75. A dual school system is one in which a white school and black school may be
identified by various factors. These factors may include but are not limited to: disparity in
the quality of school buildings and equipment and racial composition of teachers and staff.
See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208-09.
76. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 6, 14-16,
18 (involving desegregation in North Carolina). Cf Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 722
(concerning segregation in Detroit, Michigan).
In actuality, Northern racism was more deep and profound than that in the Southern
states. Kenneth B. Clark, RacialProgressand Retreat: A PersonalMemoir, in RACE IN
AMERICA 3, 17 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr., eds. 1993). Segregation increased as
white parents moved from inner cities to suburbs. Id. at 18.
77. Nathaniel R. Jones, Civil Rights After Brown, in RACE INAMERICA 97, 105.
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tion), 8 universities have implemented special admissions programs in order

to recruit more minority students. 79 However, such race-conscious
affirmative action programs differ from school desegregation decrees which
require constitutional violations for their validation. Instead, they, as the
United States Supreme Court has appeared to believe, are often executed in
the absence of constitutional violations.8 0 These programs have been
challenged by white candidates as evidence of "reverse discrimination" and
consequently violative of the Equal Protection Clause." l

An example of this type of challenge is demonstrated in Regents of the

Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 2 Bakke was a white male who, despite his
Medical College Admissions Test score and grades that were considerably
higher than those of some minority applicants who were admitted, was twice
denied admission to the University of California at Davis Medical School. 3

The prescribed number of special admissions which was limited to a
"minority group" was sixteen. 4 The Bakke plurality held that the program
violated the Equal Protection clause.85
Contrary to judicial review of affirmative action programs in other
areas,86 Bakke did not establish any one particular standard to be applied
to education. 7 Regardless, the Court in Bakke struggled to define and
apply one. On the one hand, for instance, Justice Powell asserted that

78. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301 (1978).
79. Id.

80. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 (finding no constitutional violation on behalf of the
University of California); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 954 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'g 861
81.
82.
83.

F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
See infra Part III.A.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id.

84. Id. at 274, 275 (stating that a "minority group" consisted of "Blacks," "Chicanos,"
"Asians," and "American Indians"). Basically, the total number of seats available to both
regular and special admittees each year was 100. Id. at 272.
85. Id. at 317, 326, 418. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and
Stevens concluded that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited race based programs
like the one used at U.C. Davis. Id. at 325. To the contrary, Justices Powell, White,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun believed that race may be a factor in deciding who to

admit. Id. at 325-26.
86. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to voluntary state and local subcontracting plans); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2113 (1996) (using strict scrutiny for federal,
state, and local Affirmative Action set asides in subcontracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270, 274 (1986) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based employment
layoffs); see also infra Part II.B.
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
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preferring individuals of a group solely because of race is discrimination for
its own sake"8 but may be justified if that classification is precisely tailored
to serve a compelling state interest 9 He reasoned that a more appropriate
method of admitting students than utilizing a racial quota was to use race as
a "plus," that is, to consider factors in addition to race which may promote
a diverse student body.9" Nevertheless, he rejected racial preferences to
remedy "effects of societal discrimination." 9'
Justice Powell also found that Bakke was inapposite to the school
desegregation cases which concerned race-based remedies for actual
constitutional violations. 92 In the case at bar, no constitutional violation
was judicially determined and the Court has never favored "preferential
classifications" in the absence of constitutional or statutory violations.9"
On the other hand, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall,
and Blackmun dismissed a "rational basis" standard as well as "strict
scrutiny" in reviewing benign94 racial classifications, 95 and adopted an
"intermediate standard." Under this standard, benign racial classifications
must serve important governmental interests and also be substantially related
to those goals. 96
It is unclear at present whether the Supreme Court will eventually apply

a "strict scrutiny" standard of review to race conscious programs in higher

88. Id. at 307. Powell also concluded that racial classifications are not per se invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 356.
89. Id. at 299. This is suggestive of "strict scrutiny" which is described by a
"compelling interest"/"narrowly tailored" means-end test. See, e.g., infra note 142 and the
article's discussion of Croson. "Compelling interests" encompasses promotion of diversity
(Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314) and remedying "identified discrimination" Croson,488 U.S. at 505.
"Narrowly tailored" means which involve racial classifications are those where there are no
viable alternatives which are racially neutral. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
90. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. These include, among others, personal talents and
leadership potential. Id.
91. Id. at 307.
92. Id. at 300.
93. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301-02 (1978).
94. "Benign" generally refers to racial classifications that do not have an "invidious"
or oppressive motivation. Rather, they are remedial in nature and do not impose stigmatic
effects on persons to whom they do not apply.
95. Justice Brennan stated that the program at U.C. Davis did not establish an invidious
quota since it did not inflict such an injury on whites that regardless of what they do they
will be treated as second class citizens, as opposed to discrimination against minorities, which
does. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Id. at 357-59 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan also proposed a "strict and searching" review of such programs which is
distinguishable from "strict in theory-fatal in fact," a characteristic of "strict scrutiny."
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education. What is clear, however, is a continuing pattern abrogating de
as a justification for implementing and maintaining
facto discrimination
97
them.
II. CURRENT TRENDS:
MISSOURI v. JENKINS, HOPWOOD V. TEXAS, AND OTHERS

The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, continues to refuse to
acknowledge societal discrimination as a justification for implementation of
race-conscious remedial programs. Thus, such plans are usually subjected
to exceptionally narrow scrutiny in terms of purpose, method, and/or
scope. 98

A. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

1. The United States Supreme Court
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has once again
confronted the school desegregation issue when it decided Missouri v.
Jenkins 11 99 and III 0. The result of these cases was to further confine
the exercise of the inherent equitable powers of district courts which were
addressed in Brown L Jenkins 1I concerned a finding by a district court in
1984 that the Kansas City Missouri School District ("KCMSD") and the
State of Missouri had operated a segregated school system within the
KCMSD.' 0 ' Consequently, the district court ordered the State and
KCMSD to enforce certain essential remedies to eliminate the vestiges of the
The cost of this was to be shared by the
state-imposed segregation.'
10 3
State and KCMSD.
To help finance the plan the District court enjoined the effect of a
Missouri Constitution provision which required reductions in property taxes
as the school's trust fund acquired money from the State sales tax."°4 The

97. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
98. Whereas the Supreme Court initially allowed the broad use of power by district
courts in enforcing desegregation plans, supra note 67, it has nonetheless curtailed that
power, supra note 72. Likewise, lower courts are currently somewhat restrictive in their
approaches. See infra note 136.
99. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) [hereinafter Jenkinsfl].
100. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) [hereinafter Jenkins III].
101. Jenkins II, 495 U.S. at 37.
102. Those remedies included, for instance, improvement of curriculum quality and
implementation of child development programs. JenkinsI, 495 U.S. at 39.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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court also approved a "magnet schools"' ' proposal to help desegre06
gate.1
However, the "magnet schools" plan became more expensive as the
district court allowed it to expand so that most schools in the KCMSD could
become magnet schools. 0 7 As a result, the district court, although
reluctant to do so, opted to utilize its "broad equitable powers" and ordered
a property tax increase despite the failed efforts of the KCMSD to persuade
the voters to approve one. ' The State appealed and the Eighth Circuit
upheld the order but cautioned that federal/state comity principles required
deference by the court.'0 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari concerning the
property tax increase and held that ordering the increase transgressed the
precepts of comity." ° It reasoned that the district court took a "drastic
step" by imposing a tax increase and as such, intruded upon and ignored
local authority."' However, it is clearly within a federal court's power to
2
alternatively order a local governmental body to levy its own taxes." 1
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, concurred in part." 3 Kennedy stated that the District
105. "Magnet schools"are basically high quality public schools of voluntary enrollment
which are meant to encourage integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods
and private schools. Id. at 40 n.6. The district court authorized approximately twenty-six
million dollars for operation and capital improvements of six magnet schools. Id. at 40.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. JenkinslI,495 U.S. at 40, 41. The district court ordered the increase forthe 199192 fiscal year even though voters had consistently resisted such an increase since 1969. Id.
at 39, 41.
109. Id. at 43. In order to pay deference to legislative authority, "minimally obtrusive
methods" should be employed by the district court in remedying the constitutional violation.
Id. Furthermore, in the future the district court should not set the property tax rate itself but
instead authorize the KCMSD to submit a levy to the State. Nevertheless, it could and should
enjoin the operation of state laws preventing KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy.
Id.
110. Id. at 45, 50.
111. Id. at 51.
112. Jenkinsl, 495 U.S. at 55. In addition, where local governments have Fourteenth
Amendment obligations, State policy is subordinate to federal guarantees if that policy
inhibits or impedes the disestablishment of a dual school system. Id. at 57. The Court
utilized this rationale to assert that by allowing the KCMSD itself to mandate a tax increase
there would be no Tenth Amendment nor Article III violations. Id. at 55. The Court,
although affirming the appellate court's judgment in requiring the district court to modify its
funding order, remanded the case to reverse the part of the decision that allowed the tax
increase to stand. Id. at 58.
113. JenkinsII, 495 U.S. at 58, 64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
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court exceeded its authority to tax but asserted that there really is no

difference between direct taxation by a federal court and an order mandating
a school district to impose the tax." 4 Finally, although the Court did not
reach the issue of the scope of the "magnet schools" plan, Kennedy briefly

discussed it and claimed that the KCMSD did not adequately consider the

financial consequences of the plan."'
quently review its scope in Jenkins II1.

The Court did, however, subse-

The State in Jenkins III challenged the district court's 1985 desegregation order of salary increases for almost all instructional and non-instruction-

al staff within the KCMSD and its order requiring the State to continue to
fund remedial "quality education" programs since student achievement levels
were still "at or below" national norms." 6

The Court discussed the

"magnet schools" and capital improvements plan which was designed to

attract non-minorities back to the KCMSD by making the KCMSD schools
comparable to the neighboring suburban schools and to achieve the goal of
"desegregative attractiveness.""'
The Court stated that even though the
district court and court of appeals found that this case did not concern an
interdistrict constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, they
nonetheless believed that since the KCMSD enrollment stayed 68.3 percent
black, a purely intradistrict remedy would be inadequate."'
Regardless of those findings, the Supreme Court first held that the
district court's order of salary increases as a means to eliminate the vestiges
of segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the
KCMSD, was beyond its discretion."' The Court further found that the
district court impermissibly enforced an interdistrict remedy by means of the
"magnet schools" plan despite an intradistrict violation, and this was
contrary to the rule in Milliken L12O The Court rejected the KCMSD's
reliance on the District court's statement that segregation led to "white
flight" from the KCMSD to suburban districts. Rather, the Court suggested

114. Id. at 58, 64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). The Justice also expressed due
process concerns because taxpayers have no opportunity to be heard when a court mandates
a tax increase but there is no such problem when a legislature imposes a tax increase since
it consists of representatives who are given power by citizens' consent. Id. at 66 (Kennedy,

J.,
concurring in part).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 59 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
Id. at 2044, 2050.
Jenkins II,115 S. Ct. at 2050.
Id. at 2055.
Id. at 2051; see supra note 72.
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that the flight may result not from de jure segregation but rather from
desegregation. 2 '
Finally, the Court held that the district court's order requiring the State
to continue to fund the quality education programs that were in place
because student achievement levels were below national norms is unsustainable.'22 It explained that the district court should decide on remand
whether the reduction in the achievement of minority students caused by
prior de jure segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable.' 23
This decision would thus determine whether the previously segregated
district has achieved partial unitary status and to also acknowledge the goal
of restoration of local control.' 24 Additionally, the district court should
consider that external factors beyond the control of the KCMSD and the
State affect minority achievement and as long as they are not caused by
unlawful segregation they play no role in developing the remedy.'25
Justice O'Connor, concurring, emphasized that many "factors of human
existence" can cause discrimination and cannot be readily remedied by the
courts absent a constitutional violation but are best addressed by the
legislature.' 26 Justice Thomas, also concurring, stated that district courts
must not confuse the results of de jure segregation with those of private
choices or social forces since the latter may have little to do with a de jure
violation.'27 He additionally advocated the adoption of strict scrutiny to
desegregation decrees. 2
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Breyer, asserted that there was a segregative effect that exceeded district
borders which the district and appellate courts did find. The Court found
that unconstitutionally segregated schools led to "white flight" from the

121. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2051. Furthermore, the Court supported its rationale by

arguing that affirmative implementation of the plan would create no limits to the duration of
the district court's involvement. Id. at 2054. Rather, it is crucial to defer to the interests of
the State and local authorities in directing their own affairs and to realize that local autonomy
of school districts is a national tradition. Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 2055.
Id. at 2056.
JenkinslI, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
Id. at 2056.

126. Id. at 2060, 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Also, if legislative efforts classify

by race, application of strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, fatal in fact." Instead, it is the
only way to distinguish between unconstitutional discrimination and narrowly tailored
remedial programs which were created to promote the compelling governmental interest in
vindicating effects of past discrimination. Id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

127. Id. at 2063 (Thomas, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 2073 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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KCMSD to the outlying suburbs.' 29 Additionally, Souter stated that the
majority opinion does not follow precedent because it should not review
concurrent findings of fact by two courts absent a "very obvious and
exceptional showing of error."' 3 Thus, the Court has no justification for
rejecting the courts' findings except for its assumption that integration and
not segregation caused "white flight.' 13 1 In contrast, Justice Souter
suggested that unconstitutional segregation is the origin of the causal link
between desegregation and its effects. 3 1 Justice Ginsburg, in a separate

dissenting opinion, concluded by stating that considering the history of
segregation in Missouri, and that as late as 1984 a school district was
"sorely in need," it is too early to curtail desegregation at this time. 133

In juxtaposition to the United States Supreme Court, federal district and
appellate courts currently search for constitutional violations and their effects
in determining whether desegregation decrees should be implemented,
modified, or released upon findings that school districts have achieved
unitary status. 134 Likewise, similar to Jenkins II and Jenkins III,13 5
methods and scope of remedial efforts and the objective to restore local
control are additional concerns. 36 In sum, although the lower courts,
129. Jenkins111, 115 S. Ct. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. JenkinsXll, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. See People Who Care v. Rockford Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 89-C 20168, 1996 WL
364802, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1996), rev'd and remanded (to determine proper attorney's
fees), 90 F.3d 1307 (1996); see also Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No.
4:62-7749-22, 1996 WL 294369, at *3, (D. S.C. May 24, 1996) (allowing a modification
from a prior remedial order designed to address present effects of continuing discrimination);
Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding the Cleveland School District
complied in good faith to desegregate the District by, for example, developing initiatives to
enhance self-esteem regardless of race which was done to the "extent practicable" and any
existing segregation is not attributable to the School District but instead derived from
"suburbanization" and "socioeconomic conditions.") id. at 1552; Coalition to Save Our
Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996) (holding that in vdrious areas,
such as extracurricular activities and faculty/staff assignments, defendant school districts
eliminated the vestiges of past dejure discrimination to the extent practicable. Id. at 767-68.
The court discovered that student performance disparities appeared to be caused by
socioeconomic factors and judges cannot eliminate those broad social problems with the
"stroke of a pen." Id. at 777-78.
135. See supra notes 110, 120 and accompanying text.
136. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 681
A.2d 1366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (concerning method through state funding); see also
Edgerson v. Clinton, 86 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1996) (challenging scope and holding that
a district court was not "clearly erroneous" in finding that the actions of local officials had
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consonant with the United States Supieme Court, recognize the validity of
desegregation orders which attempt to remedy effects of purposeful past (or
present) discrimination which violate the Fourteenth amendment, those
decrees cannot be so broad that they encompass means of redress for de
facto segregation which is presumptively not a result of former de jure
segregation.
Unfortunately, in as late as 1996, comprehensive desegregation
remedial orders are still essential and are being initiated or supplemented to
37
remedy the present effects of intentional discrimination.'
B.

STRICT SCRUTINY AS A TEST FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS:
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR HOPWOOD V TEXAS"..

Prior to the Hopwood case, the United States Supreme Court decided
three cases which have had profound legal implications for race-conscious
39
programs. In effect, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,' Adarand
4
Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 40 and Shaw v. Reno,' 1 may serve as indicia
of the impending destruction of all race-based remedial programs, including
those affecting higher education.

no significant interdistrict effect that would justify interdistrict relief by means of an
interdistrict magnet school plan. Rather,,the decrease in white enrollment in predominately
black schools in the district was mainly caused by demographic factors). In regards to
restoration of local control, see Coalition to Save Our Children, 90 F.3d at 758.
137. See People Who Care, 1996 WL 364802, at *1 (N.D. I!1. June 7, 1996). This
order concerned the formulation of a remedy necessitated by a 1993 and 1994 finding that
the Rockford Board of Education was guilty of intentional discrimination against minority
schoolchildren. Id. For instance, it consistently "tracked" students on a discriminatory basis
by intentionally placing many minority pupils who scored well above the national mean on
tests in "racially identifiable" low ability tracks. Whites, on the other hand, despite low or
average scores, were placed in basic or honors tracks. Id. at *6.
See alsoPennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 681 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1996). The court held that the Commonwealth and Governor should be responsible for
remedying the results of continuing defacto segregation in Philadelphia public schools. Id.
at 1389. The court stated that not only was the Philadelphia School District the only district
with no power to tax, but for 1994-95, it had the lowest resources and per pupil expenditure
in the region. The per pupil expenditure was almost $2,000 less than that of the average
suburban school district. Id. at 1372. Thus, although the court appeared to deviate from an
emerging judicial norm not to provide remedies for defacto segregation, it may be inferred
that an exception applied here since the state and governor contributed to the fiscal disparity.
138. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.
Tex. 1994).
139. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
140. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
141. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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Curtailing the employment of race-conscious remedies in the subcontracting arena, Justice O'Connor, in Croson, wrote for a divided Court.
Justice O'Connor argued that strict scrutiny is the standard which shall be
adopted to demarcate the constitutionality, or lack thereof, of a Minority
Business Plan implemented bythe City of Richmond.'42 The Plan required
prime contractors who are awarded city construction contracts, to subcontract
at least thirty percent of the contract price to one or more Minority Business
Enterprises.'43 Consequently, the Plan was struck down since it served no
compelling purpose, nor were narrowly tailored means used.'
Justice O'Connor insisted that in order for a compelling governmental
interest in remedying effects of past discrimination to exist, a proper
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings must be made of constitutional or statutory violations. 4 Such a finding was not extant in Croson. 4 6
The fact that prior to the Plan's execution, minority businesses received only
.67% of prime contracts from the City while minorities made up fifty
percent of Richmond's population was insufficient in finding a primafacie
case of a constitutional or statutory violation. 41 She additionally rejected,
as compelling interests, the generalized assertion that there has been
discrimination in an entire industry as well as remedying societal discrimination. 4 Rather, states and their subdivisions may take race-based remedial

142. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485-86.
143. Id. at 469, 477.
144. Id. at 505-08.
145. Id. at 497 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
146. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
147. Id. at 499, 500. O'Connor points out that the city reveals no knowledge of how
many Minority Business Enterprises in the market were qualified to endeavor upon
contracting work in public construction projects. Id. at 502.
148. Id. at 498, 500, 505. O'Connor first disregarded the "generalized assertion"
argument. Although the City of Richmond contended that Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980) was controlling, O'Connor disputed this notion. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486. In
Fullilove, O'Connor stated, the Court upheld a minority set-aside plan which appropriated
federal funds to state and local governments for public works projects as constitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Fullilove,O'Connor explained, was
distinguishable since Congress, contrary to the states, has broad remedial power under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 476, 487-88. It therefore may make "generalized assertions"
regarding nationwide discrimination and as a result, mandate compliance by state and local
governments to remedy the discrimination by implementing racial set-asides. Id.
Likewise, O'Connor refused to accept the purpose of remedying past societal
discrimination as a compelling interest. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505. She reasoned that
recognizing such an interest would "open the door" for all disadvantaged groups to state
claims for remedial relief. Id. at 505, 506. This would contradict the precept of equality
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 506.
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practices continue a pattern of identifiaction when they prove their fiscal
49
discrimination.1
specific
and
able
O'Connor also rejected the argument that the thirty percent quota was
narrowly tailored since the Plan was partly over inclusive and failed to
consider racially neutral means, such as granting preferences to those
undercapitalized, irrespective of race. 5 ° Moreover, O'Connor vindicated
the divided Court's holding by abolishing the distinction between "benign"
and "invidious" discrimination.'' Since racial classifications pose a threat
of stigmatization and hostility, they are all pernicious, regardless of which
race is burdened or benefitted by the classification. 2
Justice Marshall, in dissent, chastised the majority for its reversion to
53
the days when it manifested a hostile attitude toward civil rights.'
Marshall, in contrast to the majority, advocated an intermediate standard of
review. 5 4 The Justice furthermore reminded the Court that it has historically recognized a remarkable distinction between racist governmental
actions and those governmental actions which attempt to eradicate and
prevent the effects of racism.'55 Marshall candidly explained that the

149. Id. at 504.
150. Id. at 506, 507.
151. Id. at 493; see also infra Part III.B. 1 (for an explanation of "benign" as distinguishable from "invidious").
152. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 494. O'Connor also reasoned that strict scrutiny is the
best method to employ since it can "smoke out" impermissible uses of race, a "highly suspect
tool." It additionally ensures that no racial classification is utilized which is motivated by
illegitimate prejudice or stereotype because the means chosen closely "fit" a compelling goal.
Id. at 493. Furthermore, O'Connor emphasized that the rights guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment are personal rights, those possessed by the individual. Id. at 493
(quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
153. Croson, 488 U.S. at 561 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For instance, Justice Marshall asserted that
the City's interest in ameliorating effects of past racial discrimination was an important
interest. Id. at 536 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Not only was it important, but compelling. Id.
The Plan was also substantially tailored to this goal in that the Plan's duration was limited
to a five-year span and additionally contained a "waiver" provision which did not require
nonminority firms to comply with the requirement due to lack of feasibility. Id. at 548
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Plan had a "minimal impact" on "innocent third
parties" since the thirty percent set-aside essentially transposed to three percent of overall
local contracting. Id.
155. Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980)). Marshall also referred to the characterization of a suspect
racial class based on "traditional indicia of suspectness" which nonminorities in Richmond
do not possess since they have no "history of purposeful unequal treatment." Croson, 488
U.S. at 553-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). Finally, Marshall stated the Court should adhere to the

1997]

BLIND LEADING THE COLORBLIND

majority "constitutionaliz[es] its wishful thinking" by failing to recognize the
continuing impact of racism. '56
Justice Marshall's foreboding and disheartening reproach went
unheeded. Once again, a divided Supreme Court, in Adarand, held that all
racial classifications prescribed by federal, state, or local government actors
shall be subject to strict scrutiny judicial review and remanded the case to
determine whether the test was met.'5 7 Adarand involved a federal law
which granted compensation for hiring subcontractors certified as "Small
Businesses" and which are socially and economically disadvantaged.' 8 A
presumption existed that the "socially and economically disadvantaged"
included minorities and any other person found to be disadvantaged by the
Small Business Administration, pursuant to the Small Business Act.'59 As
a result of the law, a non-minority subcontractor was denied a subcontract
despite being the low bidder. 6 °
O'Connor, writing for the Court, picked up where Croson left off by
adopting strict scrutiny to the Fifth Amendment analysis.' 6 ' O'Connor
followed precedent to discover three established approaches: skepticism
(racial or ethnic classifications must receive a "most searching examination"); consistency (the type of race concerned is irrelevant in applying a
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause); and congruence
(Equal Protection claims under both the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments are
62
subject to the same analysis).'
Justice O'Connor cited to Hirabayashi v. United States'63 and
Korematsu v. United States' 4 to establish that racial classifications are
"immediately suspect" and "odius to a free people.' 65 Furthermore,
O'Connor stated that, without examining whether Fullilove v. Klutznick
would survive strict scrutiny, it is no longer controlling to the extent that it

traditional recognition of comity and thus defer to the findings of local Richmond officials
of widespread racial discrimination, which it otherwise, and egregiously, failed to do.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 543-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Croson, 488 U.S. 552, 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. 115 S. Ct. at 2113, 2118.
158. Id. at 2101.
159. Id.at 2102.
160. id.at 2101-02.
161. Id.at 2110, 2113.
162. Id.at 2111.
163. 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
164. 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
165. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106.
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may have held that "federal racial classifications are subject to a less
rigorous standard." 166
O'Connor reiterated the necessity of eliminating the distinction between
benign and invidious discrimination since racial classifications as a whole
are detrimental to society.' 67 Nevertheless, the Justice, attempting to
reassure potential critics, reasoned that strict scrutiny is actually not "strict
in theory, fatal in fact."' 68 O'Connor did leave the "door open" so to
speak, by suggesting that the "lingering effects of racial discrimination
may, in some instances, "justify a narrowly tailored
against minority groups"
' 69
remedy.'
race-based
It is possible that the plan in Adarandmay have survived strict scrutiny
had it been couched in racially neutral terms instead of enforcing a
presumption of disadvantaged status on the part of minority groups. This
would have captured the essence of O'Connor's description of "narrowly
tailored means."' 70
Finally, the Supreme Court demonstrated its loyal attachment to the
strict scrutiny standard of review when it analyzed affirmative action in the
voting field in Shaw v. Reno. Shaw involved a North Carolina reapportionment plan which, as a result of race-based legislation, created a second
majority-black congressional district pursuant to the 1965 Voting Rights
Act.'' The district was unusually shaped, extending about 160 miles, but
Subsequently, North Carolina residents
was exceedingly narrow.'72
brought suit, alleging an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.'73 The crux
of the Plaintiffs' argument was the that the arbitrary and deliberate
concentration of black voters was based on race without regard to other,

166. Id. at 2117.

167. Id. at 2113. Justice Stevens, in dissent, fervently argued the difference between
dissenting). "Invidious"
"invidious" and "benign" discrimination. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J.,
refers to the tools used to maintain oppression and racial subordination while remedial or
"benign" preferences are simply constructed to "foster equality in society." Id. Affirmative
action is commonly known as being the "benign" type, reflecting good, as opposed to bad,
intentions. See id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Stevens also chided the majority for ignoring the competence of Congress which was
accentuated in Fullilove. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally,
he expressed discontent regarding the use of strict scrutiny in that the standard will indeed
assure the fatality of racially benign programs. Id. at 2120 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2117.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 506, 507.

171. 509 U.S. 630, 633.
172. Id. at 635.
173. Id. at 636.
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non-racial factors, such as political
subdivisions or geographical boundaries,
74
and was unconstitutional.1
Although O'Connor acknowledged the nation's disparaging racial
history in the voting area, 75 the Court in Shaw ruled that state legislation
which imposes racial classifications is required, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis. 71 Since the
redistricting was facially so irregular, it can rationally be concluded that it
was done not for a compelling reason, but instead for the purpose of racially
segregating voters without giving consideration to traditional districting

precepts.

77

The plaintiffs therefore stated a claim upon which relief could

178

be granted.
Interestingly, the precedent upon which the Court in Shaw relied to
afford protection to the plaintiffs was the case law that concerned challengers of policies which allegedly discriminated against blacks. Those
challengers, though, were denied the protection given to the Shaw

plaintiffs. 17

Moreover, O'Connor equated a racial redistricting plan with "political
apartheid" but approved redistricting that is based on other criteria, such as
making political subdivisions. 0 As a result, the Court remanded the case
to the district court to determine, in the event the alleged racial gerrymander
is not contradicted, whether it meets the strict scrutiny test.' 8'

174. Id. at 637.
175. Id. at 639-41 (discussing the racial subjugation of blacks by means of vote dilution
so that they were disempowered by various states, through racial gerrymandering, and thus
had little, if any voting clout).
176. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (reiterating the same rationale employed in Croson and
emphasizing the prohibition of racially discriminating between individuals). O'Connor
claimed that it is impossible to determine the difference between "benign" and "invidious"
racial classifications because they both generate stigmatizing and resentful feelings. Id. In
addition, the same result occurs when racially neutral standards exist but which are "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Id. (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
177. Id. at 642.
178. Id.
179. The plaintiffs in ArlingtonHeights and Washington v. Davis lost their discrimination suits. See Arlington Heights,429 U.S. at 254, 255; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
232 (1976).
180. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. O'Connor also suggests that racial districting will increase
the chance that elected officials will believe their main duty is to represent the interests of
the members of the group who are intended to be catered, rather than to represent the whole
constituency. Id. at 648. Additionally, this perception will reinforce and foster stereotypes.
Id. at 650.
181. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653.
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Justice White, with whom Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in
dissent, insisted that the majority diverged from precedent in that it
disregarded the fact that the plaintiffs alleged no "cognizable injury" nor did
they prove the intent of the defendants to dilute their voting power.182
Similarly, Stevens dissented and questioned why, if it is legitimate to create
districts based on providing representation for other groups, like Polish
Americans, Hasidic Jews, and rural voters, is it not also permissible to do
the same for African-Americans?"8 3 After all, African-Americans make
up the particular minority group whose place in United States history gave
rise to the Equal Protection Clause.' 84 Justice Stevens asks a very provoking question. However, the Supreme Court, judging from its rulings in
Croson, Adarand, and Shaw, appears to be in no hurry to answer it.
Croson, Adarand, and Shaw are extremely significant in that they
conceivably foretell the progressive deterioration of affirmative action
programs. Accordingly, they are analogous to recent school desegregation
cases, like Jenkins II1, because they fail to recognize the perpetuity of subtle
and overt racism against minorities. 85 At the same time, however, they
contradict their deference to local control by striking down the voluntary
race-based remedial programs local officials have undertaken to implement. 6 By promulgating strict scrutiny as an appropriate judicial

182. Id. at 659-63 (White, J., dissenting). Historically the question has been whether
a particular group has been denied access to the political system. Id. at 661-62. Justice
White also argued that there was probably no intent to discriminate against the plaintiffs who
were members of the "majority group" by denying them political power. Id. at 666-67
(White, J., dissenting). Additionally, North Carolina has engaged in discriminatory voting
practices against black citizens and there is a possibility it may do so again. Id. at 665
(White, J., dissenting).
In sum, there must be an allegation of discriminatory intent and effect in order to
state a claim pertaining to redistricting and neither was proven in this case. Id. at 669-70
(White, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09 for emphasis that
eradicating societal discrimination is not a compelling interest); see alsosupra notes 121-26
and accompanying text discussing Jenkins III.
186. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing Jenkins III); see also
Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299 (stating local school officials have main responsibility for assessing
and solving school problems); cf Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 30809, and requiring judicial, administrative, or legislative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations to justify a governmental interest in remedying effects of past discrimination).
Croson, as a result, ignored such findings which were made by local officials. See
supra note 154. Adarand consistently utilized this rationale when, despite deferring to
Congress in Croson, it nonetheless declined, even incrementally, to do so.
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standard, the Court affords opportunities for its use in other contexts,
including higher education.
C.

17
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: HOPWOOD v. TEXAS 1
AND THE AFFIRMATIVE "RACE" TO CONSTRICT REMEDIAL EFFORTS

1.

Hopwood at the District Court

Four white plaintiffs brought suit against the University of Texas Law
School and a number of defendants, alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations. 188

Recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to remedy
racial discrimination and acknowledging the "long history" of its pervasiveness throughout Texas and the rest of society,"8 9 the district court nevertheless held that the school's 1992 affirmative action program failed to pass
constitutional muster. 9 ' In making this conclusion, the court applied strict
judicial scrutiny and cited to Croson, among others, for support.' 9' Although

187. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
188. The plaintiffs also claimed the defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553. They argued that they suffered from racial discrimination
in that the Defendants favored less qualified black and Mexican law school applicants by
means of a quota system. Id.
Plaintiffs challenged the 1992 admissionsprocesswhich established separatemethods
of review of minority and non-minority files. Different "TIs" were used for each group and
within the minority group as guides for admission. "TI" stands for Texas Index and is
calculated by the Law School Data Assembly Service. It embodies an applicant's GPA and
LSAT scores. Id. at 557 n.9.
The school considered other factors as well, such as undergraduate major and
institution, and residency. Id. at 560-61. In effect, presumptive admission and denial scores
(utilized to determine automatic admission or denial) differed between whites and non-whites.
This resulted in a higher presumptive denial score for non-minorities than the presumptive
admission score for minorities. Id. at 562.
In addition, separate committees were established to review minority and nonminority files that were placed in the "discretionary zone," that is, those considered
somewhere between presumptive admission and denial. Id. The consequence was that
whereas each member of the non-minority admission committee reviewed and appropriated
a limited number of admission votes to files within an assigned stack, the minority subcommittee members met as a group, reviewed each minority candidate's file, and essentially
decided who was to be admitted while attempting to meet numeric goals subject to the pool
of qualified applicants. Id. at 562-63.
189. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553-57.
190. Id. at 554.
191. Id. at 568-69.
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the court stated the compelling interest prong 92 of the strict scrutiny test
was met, the program was not narrowly tailored to its goal of promoting
ethnic diversity and remedying the effects of past discrimination.'
As

an alternative, the court advocated Justice Powell's approach in Bakke which
would entail review of a number of factors, with race as a "plus," in order

to determine who is best qualified instead of admitting a minority student
94
solely on the basis of race. 1
Finally, although the program failed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, the court found that the defendants met their burden of proving
that even if the admissions process were constitutionally valid, most likely
the plaintiffs would not have been offered admission.
As a result, the
court refused to order injunctive relief by ordering the plaintiffs' admission
to the law school. 96

192. The court explained that under Brown I the Supreme Court acknowledges the
significant role education plays in society. Id. at 570 n.59. Therefore, without an express
statement from the Court overruling Bakke, the attainment of educational benefits resulting
from racial and ethnic diversity continues to be a compelling interest which justifies the use
of racial classifications. Id. at 570-71; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text. In
addition, the State's colleges and universities are linked to the primary and secondary schools
in the system from which minorities have suffered discrimination, i.e., the residual effects of
the past. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571-72.
Finally, a system of higher education is under an "affirmative duty" to eliminate all
vestiges of racial segregation and discrimination within that system. Id. at 571 (quoting
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992)). Consequently, the remedial purpose of
the law school's affirmative action program is compelling. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 573.
193. Id. at 579.
194. Id. at 578; see supra note 89 and accompanying text. In order to achieve the
compelling objectives of diversity and remedying effects of past discrimination and yet to
also respect the interest in protecting individual rights, it is ideal to implement a method
where the qualifications of all applicants, minority or non-minority, are evaluated and
compared with those of other individuals in the pool. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578.
195. Id. at 581. It is also noteworthy that the court discovered that it was not clear that
plaintiffs were denied admission due to race or ethnic origin. Even though they had TIs
higher than most minorities offered admission, 109 non-minority residents with TIs lower
than that of one plaintiff were offered admission and 67 non-minority residents with TIs
lower than the other three plaintiffs were also admitted. Id. at 581.
196. Id. at 582. However, it allowed them to reapply without further administrative
costs and entered judgment declaring that the law school's admission process violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 582-83. The law school subsequently established a new
procedure for the 1995 entering class which eliminated the separate minority subcommittee
and presumptive admission and denial scores. Id. at 582 n.87.
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Appellate Review

In March 1996, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district
court's holding. 197 Not only did the appellate court find no compelling
interest for the law school's 1992 admission process under the Fourteenth
Amendment or United States Supreme Court precedent, it also concluded
that the law school could no longer use race as a factor at all in admissions.'9 ' It reasoned that pursuant to the tenets embodied in prior Supreme Court cases, preference based only on race or ethnic origin is
discrimination and is usually irrelevant and prohibited. 99
Thus, the court argued that without a doubt courts are to use strict
scrutiny when reviewing all racial classifications, whether or not they are
"benign." Also, courts should recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides individual guarantees and as such the United States Supreme Court
has rejected "group benefits" based on race.2"' In the present case, the
court pointed out that no case since Bakke has allowed diversity as a
compelling state interest under strict scrutiny.2 '
Diversity, the court
reasoned, perpetuates rather than minimizes the use of race by treating
minorities as a group instead of as individuals. This therefore promotes
racial stereotypes and hostility. 2 ' The court further stated that the
admissions procedure did not further this interest because the remedial goal
was too broad.20 3 It asserted that the Supreme Court has required a
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before
allowing racial classifications as a remedy to that discrimination.2 4 In this
case, the court believed there was no evidence that the University of Texas
has officially allowed discrimination recently at the school. Further, past
discrimination in education other than at the law school cannot be used to
condone race as a factor in law school admissions.2 5 Finding that the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test was not satisfied, the court did not reach the

197. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.
Tex. 1994).
198. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934-35.
199. Id. at 940 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) and
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
200. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940, 941 (referring to Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-500 (1989)).
201. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
202. Id. at 944-45.
203. Id. at 951.
204. Id. at 949.
205. 78 F.3d at 954.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

narrowly tailored question.2"6 0 It7 remanded the case to the district court to
2
reconsider the damages issue.
In April 1996, the court denied a rehearing and rehearing en banc.2 °s
Notably, the dissenters to the rehearing denials predicted that the result of
the appellate court's opinion would fundamentally impact public educational
institutions in Texas as well as other states in the country.2 9 They argued
that the court majority had engaged in "judicial activism" by overruling
Bakke,"' which had stated that racial classifications are not perse illegal. 21
They insisted this was improper since the Supreme Court has ruled that even
if its precedent may directly apply to a case being heard by a lower court
but seems to contain reasoning rejected by other decisions, the lower court
should follow the directly controlling case and leave the Supreme Court the
choice of overruling its own decisions." 2 Essentially, just because the
majority members believe that the Supreme Court will overrule Bakke, they
cannot take the initiative to do so themselves. Therefore, since the Supreme
Court has not yet overruled Bakke, the dissenters argued diversity should
still be a compelling governmental interest.2"'
3.

The United States Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari:Why?

The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in July 1996.2"4
It did so because the University of Texas law school discontinued the
admissions program previously in dispute. 2 5 Therefore, the case was

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 955.
Id. at 962.
Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (denying rehearing and rehearing en banc) (1996).
Id. at 722. This concern is shared by others. See, e.g., Taxman v. Board. of Educ.,

91 F.3d 1547 (3rd. Cir. 1996) (concerning a school board's affirmative action plan of
preferring minority over non-minority teachers in layoff decisions); Back v. Carter, 933 F.
Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (regarding the use of race and gender quotas for county judicial
membership); Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (involving a city ordinance allotting a certain percentage of dollar amount
of subcontracts to women and minority-owned firms); Sabrina L. Miller, CollegesDefending
Affirmative Action Admissions: Texas Ruling, CaliforniaAction Raise Concerns at Illinois
Schools, CI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1996, at I.

210. Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722, 724.
211. See supra note 88.

212.
213.
214.
215.

Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 723.
Id. at 724.
Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
Id. at 2582.
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moot and as a result the Court opted to "await a final judgment on a
program genuinely in controversy. 216
One wonders what will result if that "awaiting" day arrives. Although
only speculative, considering the trends exhibited by the Supreme Court
concerning treatment of race conscious remedial programs, it may be
anticipated that the Court will apply strict scrutiny as well to affirmative
action programs in higher education. Despite the fact that the Court has
21 7
recognized the importance of education, its deference to stare decisis
may induce the Court to apply this standard of review. If this occurs, in
effect affirmative action will come to its demise.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
RECONSTRUCTION OR IMPENDING DESTRUCTION?

The school desegregation cases and the use of strict scrutiny in Croson,
Adarand, Shaw, and Hopwood, augurs the inevitable escalation of the
elimination of race-conscious remedial programs. The adversity faced by
affirmative action proponents is especially cumbersome since the Supreme
Court has required proof of actual constitutional or statutory violations, such
as effects of past discrimination, to uphold race-based remedies.2"'
However, violations are often not judicially found.2 19
In order to ensure the existence of affirmative action, it is imperative
that, considering the essential and vital role education plays in society,22 °
the United States Supreme Court adopt a less rigorous standard of review
for affirmative action programs in higher education, especially those which
assist African Americans. However, before analyzing the reasoning of this,
it is necessary to examine the contrary views of those who either wholeheartedly oppose affirmative action or simply wish for its reformation (those
usually known as "individual rights" advocates), and those who believe it
must continue ("group rights" proponents).
216. Id.
217. To achieve consistency and to avoid multiple standards of review, the Court may
follow Adarand, Croson, and Shaw, and apply strict scrutiny. See supra Part II.B. In
addition, application of strict scrutiny in the context of higher education would comply with
the reasoning exemplified in the school desegregation cases. This would be accomplished
by first rejecting, as a compelling governmental interest, the elimination of defacto segregation and secondly, by finding that non-racial factors, such as class, are available, and thus,
a race-based affirmative action program is not narrowly tailored. See generallysupra Part
II.
218. See, e.g., supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Croson).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., supra note 57 (discussing Brown I); see infra notes 311, 312 and
accompanying text (discussing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Individual rights advocates argue that the Fourteenth Amendment, by
its literal interpretation, protects personal, not group, rights. Consequently,
individual rights are controlling and are embodied in the word and spirit of
" ' Furthermore,
the Fourteenth Amendment.22
individual rights proponents
adhere to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, that the Constitution is
"colorblind," to justify their views.222 Justice Scalia, for example, typifies
this belief in his opinions.223 Since the Constitution is indeed "colorblind," they argue, any preferences based on race should be closely
analyzed. These include affirmative action programs or school desegregation decrees which interfere with the personal choices of individuals, to
achieve racial unitary status.224
Individual rights advocates most likely would applaud the Supreme
Court's recent posture toward race-conscious programs in that strict scrutiny
is an effective means to discover improper uses of racial preferences and
that it is also impermissibly burdensome to "force" compliance with school
desegregation efforts.225 They view school desegregation as a costly and
unnecessary intervention which impairs their ability to decide where their
children should live and attend school.226
Having established that the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals,
as opposed to group rights, the individual rights proponents assert basically
22 1. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); Brody, supra note 20, at 331; Ken
Feagins, Wanted - Diversity: White HeterosexualMales Need Not Apply, 4 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 1, 7 (1994) (indicating that the "national interest" and "welfare of the group" are
subordinate to the "autonomy, integrity, and dignity of the individual").
222. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
223. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring), stating that uses of
governmental racial classifications are not solutions to the tendency to "classify and judge
men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin"); Adarand
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (contending
that although persons who have suffered wrongs by unlawful racial discrimination should be
compensated, "under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a
debtor race").
224. Neutral policies which result in individual choices regarding work or residence that
produce de facto segregation are not unconstitutional. Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2065
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
225. This may be characterized as "forced association"which presumptively exacerbates
antagonism. See Conference, Race, Law, andJustice:The Rehnquist Court andthe American
Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 567, 596 (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter Race, Law, and Justice].
226. See, e.g., Jenkins III, 495 U.S. at 40, 42 (where voters failed to vote for a tax
increase to finance a desegregation plan and local taxpayers attempted to intervene in the
suit). In addition, those who have resisted school desegregation efforts have at times been
hostile. See supra notes 68, 73 and accompanying text.
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three impediments to racial progress which derive from race-based remedial

efforts: it is "reverse discrimination," it disregards the notion of merit, and
it evokes racial stigmatization and hostility.
First, it is urged that affirmative action, without proof of actual
unconstitutional effects of past discrimination, flagrantly denies "innocent
individuals" of the right to be considered for such things as jobs and
university admissions, based on personal qualifications. This is inherently
unfair because those qualifications are treated as secondary to other, nonmeritorious factors, such as gender or race.227 Those considerations based
on race are particularly onerous.22 Those favoring individual rights often
assert that they are "innocent victims" because they are not responsible for
slavery or any other form of racism which caused racial injustices.229
Individual rights advocates claim that there is no difference between
"benign" and "invidious" racial classifications since any racial classification
generates animosity, frustration, and reinforces racism.230 Additionally,
it is also unclear when a person needs the benefits of an affirmative action
program. At times it is both over inclusive in helping those who are not
truly disadvantaged and under inclusive by failing to assist those who most
need it.2 ' In sum, affirmative action is fallacious because "two wrongs do
'
not make a right."232
Furthermore, the Constitution does not guarantee
233
equal results.

227. See Krista L. Cosner, Note, AffirmativeAction in HigherEducation: Lessons and
DirectionsFrom the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L. J. 1003, 1008 (1996).
228. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (noting that gender-based classifications are not
considered "inherently odius," contrary to racial ones).
229. See Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another
IllustrationofAmericaDenyingtheImpact ofRace, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1089, 1132 (1993);
Daniel G. Lugo, Don't Believe the Hype: AffirmativeAction in Large Law Firms, 11 LAW
& INEQ. J.615, 623 (1993).
230. See supranotes 150, 151; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-96; Feagins, supra note 221, at
21 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990)).
231. Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
PreferentialTreatment, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER J.1, 14 (1994) (stating that those who
disfavor affirmative action argue that it is "reverse discrimination" by granting preferences
to the "undeserving" at the expense of others); Morton, supra note 229, at 1118, see also
Robin D. Barnes, PoliticsandPassion:Theoretically A DangerousLiaison, 101 YALE L.J.
1631 (1992) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY (1991) and PATRICIA J.WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
According to Barnes, Carter believes that currently Affirmative Action, by rejecting present
determinations of merit, both only helps blacks who are most empowered and falters by
neglecting those of greatest need. Id. at 1636.
232. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
233. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
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Secondly, affirmative action critics challenge such programs because

they allegedly disregard traditional precepts of merit. Essentially, they

contend that affirmative action is an affront to those who possess meritorious attributes."" For instance, many aver that qualified whites, particularly white males, are losing opportunities to persons they consider to be less
qualified.235 These are individuals assumed to be the "best and brightest"
who are more capable of providing quality services, efficiency, and
productivity.23 6
Finally, to make matters particularly vexatious, affirmative action
contenders argue that race-based remedial programs encourage racial
stigmatization and hostility. Rather than unifying the meritorious interests
of individuals without regard to race, gender, or sexual orientation, groupbased preferences are not unifying because they perpetuate deep resentment
among white heterosexual males.237 This belief is further supplemented
by a perception that the harms suffered by white males caused by intentional
racial or gender discrimination is just as sound as those experienced by

women and minorities.238

Supplementing the idea that affirmative action promotes racial hostility,
individual rights proponents insist that affirmative action actually harms
those whom it is intended to benefit. The rationale for this proposition is

234. Lugo, supra note 229, at 618.
235. Nathaniel R. Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The Road Not Taken- An American
Tragedy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 966 (1996) [hereinafter Jones, The Harlan Dissent].
The judge finds that complaints of reverse discrimination are similar to those made in 1875.
Id. at 968.
236. Myri L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal
Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (Summer 1982).
237. Feagins, supra note 221, at 610; see also Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486
(1995). In Miller, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Georgia's congressional
majority-minority redistricting plan pursuant to Shaw. Id. at 2485-86; see supra notes 170183. According to Justice Stevens, the conclusion of the MillerCourt that the plaintiffs had
standing to assert a Shaw claim, reflects the Court's great concern regarding what the Justice
called the potential "representational harms" suffered by whites, which may ensue as of
consequence to such a plan. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Those harms, according to Stevens, are those which arose when deliberate racial
gerrymandering is accomplished and persons perceive that the elected individuals will
consider the interests of the racial group of which they are members as predominant over
those of the whole constituency. Id. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the
plaintiffs, as in Shaw, proved no injury as a result of the redistricting plan, the Court held
the plan did not meet the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 2491 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding no
compelling interest).
238. Feagins, supra note 221, at 35-36.
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that group-based preferences reinforce stereotypes because they sacrifice
traditional standards of merit for the fulfillment of goals only by virtue of
one's affiliation with a certain group. 2
These stereotypes serve to
enhance ideas that affirmative action beneficiaries are incapable of being
successful based on individual ability.24 They therefore harbor prejudice
by creating assumptions that those beneficiaries share particular characteris-

tics indicated by group membership. 4 ' Consequently, affirmative action

engenders feelings of inferiority among its beneficiaries which Brown I was
meant to prohibit.24 2
Additionally, the argument exists that affirmative action recipients are
often afflicted with self-doubt regarding whether or not they deserve the
benefits received24 3 and also remain victimized if they, for example, are
admitted to universities despite having lower test scores than whites males
who are denied admission.24 4 In order for the public to conceptualize this,
affirmative action opponents generally utilize African American "figureheads" to vindicate their views. These include, for instance, Justice
245
Clarence Thomas, Shelby Steel, Stephen Carter, and Ward Connerly.
Using these individuals for support may indicate an effort to make their
views more acceptable to people who disagree with their viewpoints.
Finally, individual rights proponents disparage the use of race-based
remedial programs absent proof of a constitutional violation, such as effects
of past discrimination. As a result, they, like the Supreme Court in Jenkins
III, Croson, and Adarand, strongly disfavor societal discrimination as a

239. Id. at 35-36.

240. Id; see alsoHarris & Narayan, supranote 231, at 29 (referring to stereotypes about
African Americans).
241. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996) rev'g 861 F. Supp. 55
(W.D. Tex. 1994).
242. See GERALD HORNE, REVERSING DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 26 (1992); see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486. See generallyAdarand,115 S. Ct.
at 2114. The detriment of stigmatization upon members of certain groups was a concern
addressed in Brown L
243. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV.

1745, 1772 (1996)

244. See generally, Symposium, Speeches From the FederalistSociety Fifth Annual
Lawyers'Convention:IndividualResponsibilityandthe Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 980, 98182 (1992).
245. For reference to Shelby Steele and Stephen Carter, see Barnes, supra note 23 1, at
1631. Justice Thomas is well known for his conservative views and is an advocate of

individual choices. Finally, Ward Connerly is a member of the Board of Regents of the
University of California at Davis who condones the elimination of affirmative action
programs. See infra note 282.
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validating factor for implementing affirmative action programs.""
Furthermore, they approve of plans which also meet the second prong of
strict scrutiny, those which offer "narrowly tailored" means of achieving
their goals. In other words, the affirmative action plan should be flexible,
temporary, and adopted only where there are no less intrusive, neutral
options are available.247
Thus, individual rights advocates tend to criticize race-based remedial
programs because they are group-based, which is contrary to the recognition
of individual rights exteriorized in the Fourteenth Amendment. They are
harmful because they result in reverse discrimination, debilitate standards of
merit, and immortalize racial hostility and stigmatization.
B.

GROUP RIGHTS

Contrary to individual rights proponents, group rights advocates
understand race-conscious remedial programs as essential in providing equal
opportunities for individuals who, due to stereotypes associated with
particular personal characteristics like race, have historically been assigned
to particular groups. As a result of that group assignment, they have
suffered deplorable harms to the benefit of an oppressive group, generally
white males. 48 Antithetical to individual rights advocates, group rights
supporters insist that the thrust behind the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to assist African Americans. 249
Group rights proponents have three responses to the aforementioned
views of individual rights supporters. First, "reverse discrimination" is
sophistic because it essentially fails to exist. Second, the concept of
meritocracy is ambiguous and biased, particularly racially. Third, the
concern over racial hostility and stigmatization is grossly exaggerated and
misconstrued.
1.

The Myth of "Reverse Discrimination"

First of all, group rights supporters ardently dispute the "reverse
discrimination" argument because the alleged detrimental impact suffered by

246. See Feagins, supra note 221, at 32. On the other hand, educational desegregation
decrees do not emote the same negative feelings that typical affirmative action plans do
because the former do not grant education to blacks while denying whites the same. Id. at

39.

247. Id. at 42-44.
248. See Duncan, supra note 236, at 503 (defining affirmative action); see also supra

note 11.

249. See supra Part I.A.
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white males pales in comparison to that experienced by minorities,
especially blacks,25 ° and one cannot, in examining reality, contradict this
fact. White males as a group, for instance, have more decision-making
control in hiring, business, government, and education.25' In addition,
white males benefit either directly or indirectly through "good old boy
networks." Even if he does not have a controlling position in a company,
his chances are significantly greater than an African American of obtaining
such a position, not to mention the greater degree of ease which whites
experience in searching for jobs in general. 2
The further perception that affirmative action has "gone too far" by
infiltrating labor markets with unqualified African Americans at the expense
of a plethora of qualified whites is vastly misunderstood. In other words,
misconceptions abound as far as to what extent affirmative action has
provided opportunities to minorities and women.253 While affirmative
action has had notable positive effects,254 its impact has been marginal. 5
250. Due to the unique and oppressive position African Americans have historically held
and continue to confront, the author will primarily, for the remainder of this Comment, focus
on that group.
251. See NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 207.
252. HORNE, supra note 242, at 41-43 (discussing an Urban Institute Study which
showed that concerning employment, African Americans have been subjected to subtle forms
or racism which is not generally experienced by whites). Blacks, for example, despite equal
qualifications to those of their white counterparts, have received shorter job interviews. Id.
The comments made by some interviewers were unfavorable relative to those given to whites.
Id. Also, blacks, contrary to whites, have been denied job applications. Id.
Whites, especially white males, are inarguably the disproportionate beneficiaries of
other employment practices which result form conscious or unconscious biases. This
subjective form of prejudice is derived from negative stereotypes of minorities, as well as a
covert preference for white men to keep or obtain high-paying and higher-level positions.
See Harris & Narayan, supra note 231, at 20-21 (stating that "there are rules, practices, and
policies" which, regardless of intention, discriminate against minorities and women), see also
Arthur N. Frakt, Affirmative Action: A Dean's Reflections, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 30
(1995).
253. Although support by white males has decreased over approximately the last five
years, a number of them have discovered that affirmative action programs have not caused
as great an increase in the hiring of women and minorities as anticipated. See Jonathan
Kaufman, Mood Swing: White Men Shake Off That Losing Feeling on Affirmative Action,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.
254. See, e.g., Dixon Haynes, Black EntrepreneursForesee New Hurdles, Backlash
Against Sei-AsidesCited,CHI. TRIB, Nov. 24, 1996, sec. I at 6 (citing a United States Census
Bureau report that the number of black-owned businesses increased by 46 percent over the
last decade).
255. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, TurningBack the Clock, TIME, Mar. 20, 1995, at 37; see
also Women StillFavorAffirmativeAction, MARKETING TO WOMEN, Sept. 1, 1995, available
in Westlaw, 1995 WL 8468029; Gabrielle Custer, AffirmativeAction ProgramsLevelPlaying
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In fact, due to a lifting of governmental pressure which may be motivated
by a societal desire to appease white males, companies throughout the
United States are curtailing their affirmative action recruitment programs.
The elimination of such programs demonstrates that many companies
actually disapprove of affirmative action programs.256
In the educational realm, the "reverse discrimination" argument is
manifested by concerns of university students that most minorities who are
admitted are unqualified which is thus unfair to white students who are
qualified but were denied admission. In addition, many white college
students fear that minorities will, due to affirmative action employment
programs, "steal" post-graduate jobs from them.257
Group rights supporters have two responses to this perception. First,
there is no clear indicia that a large number of qualified students have been
denied admission to universities as a result of affirmative action.
"Institutional interest" may be given credit for this trend because despite
failure to meet the usual "merit-based" criteria required for university
admissions, many students are admitted for financial and other non-academic
reasons.2 9 More often than not, the beneficiaries of these admissions are
While race-based affirmative action programs are severely
whites.
challenged and blamed for encouraging racism, "institutional interest"

Field for Minority Firms, DAILY REc., June 23, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL
7888582, at *9 (examining the disparities between blacks and whites in terms of employment
and the incremental positive effects for minority-owned business enterprises).
256. See Kaufman, supra note 253, at Al, A6; see also Alison M. Konrad & Frank
Linnehan, FormalizedHRM Structures: CoordinatingEqual Employment Opportunity or
Concealing OrganizationalPractices?,ACAD. OF MGMT. J., June 1, 1995, at 2, 3, 19-20,
availablein Westlaw, 1995 WL 12062406 (discussing findings that since "identity blind"
hiring measures which discount gender and race are preferred over "identity conscious"
means which consider gender and/or race, hiring practices have not resulted in a significant
proliferation of minorities and women in United States labor markets).
257. See LUGO, supra note 229, at 618.
258. Miller, supra note 209. HORNE, supra note 242, at 32.
259. There is favoritism for relatives of wealthy alumni. Ken Myers, Sometimesit 'sNot
What You Know... Law Deans Debate Admitting Students for the Wealth and Influence
They Bring, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 26, 1994, at A 1; see also Jones, Rise and Fall,supra note 1I,
at 345, 356. Additional favoritism is exemplified by accepting athletes, which include
whites, who are of low academic standing. Barbara R. Bergmann, Q: Should Washington
HaltRace-BasedPoliciesforHiringand Contracting?The Jobs-BiasAgainst Minoritiesand
Women StillNeeds a Remedy, INSIGHT MAG., May 6, 1996, at 25. These athletes do displace
black students who have better test scores and grades. Id. Furthermore, some university
deans have considerable discretion in selecting whichever admittees they prefer to accept.
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programs are readily accepted.26 ° Secondly, the argument that minorities,
because of affirmative action hiring programs, pose a significant threat to
white students since they allegedly will receive the best post-graduate jobs,
is unfounded. For example, minority recruitment by large law firms is
minuscule.26 '
These two responses, according to the group rights theology, should
quell the "reverse discrimination" fear. Whites, instead of suffering from
reverse discrimination, actually benefit from racism in that they have been
bequeathed the legacy of slavery since they do not suffer from the negative
stereotypes which stigmatize minority groups, particularly African-Americans. Due to the oppressive nature of slavery, white males have benefitted
from "white male affirmative action" for centuries.262 There has never
been a need for any written affirmative policies to assist white males because,
by being male and white, they have not been systematically denied advantages that may be had by a power structure which has been maintained by white
males.263 This situation is contrary to the experience of African Americans.
Currently, whites benefit from racism, whether or not they are responsible for racial injustice. Their claims of innocence are not deceiving because
whites enjoy advantages not available to other groups, particularly African
Americans. This is explainable by the fact that whites are not burdened with
the stigmatic and demeaning stereotypes shared by blacks. The benefits
incurred by whites concern multifarious aspects of life, ranging from
employment to housing.264
Group rights advocates contend there is a definite distinction between
"benign" and "invidious" discrimination which courts must acknowledge.
These proponents insist that voluntary affirmative action programs, irrespective or whether a constitutional violation has occurred, are indeed constitutional because the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the provisiofn
of equal opportunities for traditionally disadvantaged groups, most important260. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d at 946 (5th Cir. 1996) rev'g 861 F. Supp.

551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).

261. Lugo, supranote 229, at 620 (analyzing the historic under representation of blacks
in the legal profession and citing statistics where the percentage of African American
attorneys working for large firms from 1979 to the mid-eighties has not exceeded five

percent. Id. at 620-21).

262. See Morton, supra note 229, at 1122.
263. Id.
264. Harris & Narayan, supra note 231, at 6-7. Adolph Reed, Jr., Assault on
AffirmativeAction, THE PROGRESSIVE, June 1995, at 18 (discussing the historic advantages

of being white which include numerous benefits, such as the social welfare policies which
originated from the New Deal era, as well as favoritism concerning housing, jobs, and
automobile purchases).
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ly, blacks. Therefore, affirmative action programs should be judicially
scrutinized by a more lenient standard of review because their impact on
whites is merely benign.26 This conclusion is most notably buttressed by
the further indisputable fact that as a class whites do not share the "traditional
indicia of suspectness" possessed by blacks.266 In other words, they have

not suffered, nor been injured as a group by the deleterious effects of an
oppressive system which has imposed purposeful discrimination. Instead,
blacks have suffered from a system whose roots were established by slavery.

African Americans as a group have been labeled as inferior for centuries and
continue to be so characterized.267

Group rights proponents finally rebut the "reverse discrimination"

concept by showing that affirmative action programs are neither overinclusive
nor underinclusive. First, even though middle class blacks who benefit from
affirmative action may, at first glance, appear, to be devoid of the need for
affirmative action which gives the appearance of overinclusiveness, they
nonetheless suffer from the debilitating stereotypes which accompany their
skin color.2 68 Moreover, group rights advocates assert that affirmative

action is not underinclusive because it has uplifted a myriad of African

Americans from the ranks of the lower or working class to middle or upper
class status. 269 Affirmative action is also not underinclusive since it
furthers yet another important purpose - the creation of positive role models
for African Americans which will increase opportunities for them to succeed
and can reduce frustration within black communities.270 Furthermore,
265. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (arguing that racial classifications designed for
remedial purposes must involve "substantially related" means to achieve "important
governmental" goals) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (clarifying the distinction between
"benign" and "invidious" discrimination); Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 565 & n.12
("'benign' racial remedial efforts are as old as the Fourteenth Amendment.")
266. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that whites as a class do not have any "traditional indicia of suspectness" because
they have not, for example, been rendered politically powerless, nor have they been hindered
by intentional unequal treatment); see also id. at 375 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
267. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268. See Duncan, supra note 236, at 516-18 (referring to the racial discrimination
confronted by African Americans, regardless of socio-economic background); see also
Barnes, supra note 231, at 1647-49.
269. Morton, supra note 229, at 1125-26; see Harris & Narayan, supra note 231, at 8
(noting that most blacks before the Civil Rights Era were of working class status).

270. See Harris & Narayan, supra note 231, at 27. See also Peter Annin, Battleground
Chicago: Report From the Front: How Racial Preferences Really Work-or Don't,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1995, at 26, 31-32:
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affirmative action is not clearly underinclusive because, contrary to popular
belief, even poor white males have directly benefitted from affirmative
action.27 ' Thus, due to the traditional and current pervasive racism faced
by minorities, specifically blacks, and the relative benefits derived by whites
because of racism, whites cannot, as a group, suffer from reverse discrimination.
2.

Meritocracy?

Group rights advocates present a rebuttal to the meritocracy concern.
They assert that "merit" is an ambiguous concept as its traditional standards
of test scores and grades do not accurately reflect the ability to perform
well.272 "Merit" is also unclear since society, in spite of its apparent
support of it, often does not defer to its mandates.273 Likewise, "merit" is
tainted by racial bias in that it is dictated by racially prejudiced test scores
which serve to, and perhaps are designed to, reinforce perceptions of white
racial superiority. Implicit in this conclusion is a historic presumption that
white males have merit and are thus deserving of employment or admission
to a university.2 74 The societal preference for determining merit by grades
and test scores subordinates other indications of quality. This formulates the
final result of the denial of equal opportunities to succeed for African
Americans. Therefore, the controlling societal belief that only traditional
standards of hierit are accurate indicators of success is erroneous and other
factors should be considered as criteria for college admissions and employ27 5
ment.

271. Harris & Narayan, supra note 231, at 10 (providing an example of an expansive
New York university "open admissions criteria" which has benefitted lower-middle class
whites as well as blacks).
272. HORNE, supra note 242, at 29 (discussing that although the General Aptitude Test
Battery utilized by employment agencies reveals lower test scores among blacks and Latinos
than whites, they performed better than the scores would indicate); see also Lugo, supra note
229, at 624-25.
273. These include admitting wealthy legacies to universities. See Ellis Cose, The Myth
of Meritocracy, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1995, at 34; see also Lugo, supra note 229, at 24
(finding that society is not a well-functioning meritocracy).
274. Harris & Narayan, supra note 231, at 31; see also Duncan, supra note 236, at 53536.
275. These factors may include an environmentally disadvantaged background (HORNE,
supra note 242, at 3), or motivation or perseverance (Morton, supra note 229, at 1115).
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Not Stigmatizing but Rehabilitizing

Finally, group rights supporters attempt to dispel the argument that
affirmative action creates racial hostility and stigmatization in that it is
misplaced, misunderstood, and influenced by political leaders.2 76 Racial
hostility and stigmatization are not novel societal evils. Originating from
precepts of white supremacy,277 they have existed for centuries, even in the

absence of contemporary affirmative action programs, and continue to
permeate society. Racial extremism is alive and well. Due to its infiltration
at various levels of life,27 it is exceedingly difficult to dispute that racism
remains a vitiating and omnipresent force throughout society.
Consequently, racial hostility and stigmatization, group rights theorists
argue, will stubbornly linger long after race-based remedial programs are
eliminated. This outcome thus provides the impetus for continuing
affirmative action programs because the inevitable result of their destruction
is too devastating.2 79 The situation will resemble the racial polarity which
was extant prior to the introduction of present-day affirmative action
programs. The assumed stigmatization and resentment experienced by blacks
which is currently caused by affirmative action will pale in comparison to the
racial subordination they will feel once affirmative action is abolished.2"'
This possible future could explain why many, if not most, African Americans
" '
support affirmative action.28
Private racial biases and racially subjective merit standards will ensure
their exclusion from opportunities for success.2" 2 In fact, those that achieve
high levels of success in employment or education will probably be
considered the exception rather than the rule.283 Therefore, blacks as a

77

276. Nadine Strossen, Blaming the Victim: A Critiqueof Attacks on AffirmativeAction,

L. REv. 974, 976-77 (1992).
277. Barnes, supra note 23 1, at 1640.
278. See supra notes 252, 264 accompanying text.
279. Amar & Katyal, supra note 243, at 1776.

CORNELL

280. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2123 & n.5 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) (stating that he is "not persuaded that the psychological damage brought on by
affirmative action is as severe as that engendered by racial subordination"); see also Morton,

supra note 229, at 1138 n.200; Race, Law, and Justice, supra note 225, at 583-84.
281. See, e.g., HORNE, supra note 242, at 33-34; John Zipperer, Is Discrimination
Destined to Stay?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 15, 1995, at 43.
282. See Paul E. Peterson, A PoliticallyCorrectSolution to Racial Classifications,in
CLASSIFICATION BY RACE 1, 8 (Paul Peterson ed., 1995); see also Amy Wallace & Dave
Lesher, UC Regents, in Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES, July 21,

1995, at A20.
283. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 231, at 1641.
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group will continue to carry the burden of racial stigma and remain the
scapegoats of racial hostility. As a result, affirmative action does not greatly
enhance racial hostility and stigmatization, contrary to what individual rights
proponents believe. Instead, affirmative action helps prevent these feelings
and a further widening of the "racial divide" by striving to provide qualified
African Americans equal opportunity.284
Overall, group rights advocates insist that the Fourteenth Amendment
demands the enactment and sustenance of affirmative action programs.
Perceptions of affirmative action are gravely distorted and do not, in
opposition to the typical understanding of them, cause reverse discrimination,
shun meritocracy, nor reinforce racial hostility and stigmatization. If
anything, it prevents the reversion to a racial climate penetrated by overt and
antagonistic behavior whose target has historically mainly been African
Americans.
C.

JOINING THE GROUP RIGHTS CROWD: ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR
UPHOLDING RACE-BASED REMEDIAL PROGRAMS

Society is not blind to color. Individual rights advocates urge that in
order to defeat racism it is imperative to disregard race-based remedial
programs. However, these proponents appear to take a somewhat oblivious
view of reality. Since society continues to make group-oriented distinctions
irrespective of affirmative action, group-based racial solutions are essential,
even in the absence of constitutional violations. In actuality, group rights and
individual rights may not be, at first blush, altogether discordant. Just as
those who denounce affirmative action as discriminating against individual
whites, blacks will, as individuals, suffer from an increase in discrimination
caused by the evisceration of affirmative action. For this reason, the group
rights approach presents a rational way of addressing the very real and
pervasive devastation of racism which society generally prefers to ignore.
Furthermore, there are several fortifying and well-founded reasons for courts
to adopt a group-based analysis when reviewing race-conscious remedial
plans as will be shown.
1.

Racism Exacerbated by Stereotypes Realized or Denied

Perhaps the most notorious example of racism in the United States is
slavery. However, long after the prohibition of slavery, blacks continued to
bear the deleterious impact of racism. Slavery helped establish an oppressive
system based on degrading stereotypes of African Americans which have, in
turn, provided "justification" for the continuance in white society of racist
284. Jones, Rise and Fall,supra note 11, at 351.
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behavior and attitudes which still exist today." 5 Many non-blacks still

perceive blacks as violent, lazy, and less intelligent."8 6 These stereotypes
have been the impetus for housing segregation by causing "white flight"
which thus results in educational segregation. 7 This chain of causation is
emboldened by racially biased media depictions 288 which strengthen
"afrophobic" antagonism."' The Supreme Court has not been immune to

285. See, e.g., HORNE, supra note 242, at 38 (quoting an October 3, 1991, L.A. Times
article which states that some businesses down South still have separate entrances for blacks
and whites); Barnes, supra note 23 1, at 1633 (referring to Patricia Williams' discussion about
how the use of racial stereotypes allows society to rationalize a racial double standard); id.
at 1642-43 (noting Williams' and Stephen Carter's reflections on racial stereotypes and their
concurrent stigmatization).
286. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID, SEGREGATION & THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

95 (1993).

287. This pattern may be explained as follows. First of all, the use of racial covenants
to prevent racial mixing has resulted in substandard and overcrowded housing for blacks
where they are compelled to reside in crime-ridden areas. See Isaac N. Groner & David M.
Helfeld, RaceDiscriminationinHousing, 57 YALE L.J. 426-32 (1948). Realtors contributed
to the problem by evoking fears among whites that desegregated neighborhoods would cause
property value loss. Id. at 431. In order to attempt to justify the use of these covenants and.
the acts of the realtors, it has been argued that blacks are irresponsible tenants despite
evidence to the contrary. Id. at 431-32.
Secondly, even in the 1990s, similar racial fears persist. See MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 286, at 93-94, (finding that most whites, contrary to blacks, disfavor a racially
integrated neighborhood which is 50 percent black and 50 percent white and who also fear
an increase in crime and decrease in property values resulting from desegregation). In
addition, regardless of their level of income, blacks remain highly segregated from whites.
Id. at 85. This residential segregation, caused by stereotypes and "white flight," has resulted
in educational segregation. See id. at 141-42 (finding that "segregation also concentrates
educational disadvantage").
288. For example, even though whites make up a higher percentage of drug users than
blacks, African-Americans are depicted in the news media as the predominant users. See
HORNE, supra note 242, at 55. A study done by the Center for Media and Public Affairs
concerned the research of 800 news stories out of which over 1,000 visuals of areas in which
drug activity occurred. Of those visuals, 50 percent showed minorities, especially blacks.
Additionally, more whites than blacks receive welfare. In 1993, white mothers made up a

higher percentage of welfare recipients than blacks for those mothers between the ages of 15
and 44. See UNITED STATES, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
383 (1996). The racially-focused portrayal of blacks as the primary drug
users and as welfare recipients strengthens negative stereotypes of African Americans and
UNITED STATES

consequently perpetuates racism.
289. "Afrophobic" is a term used to indicate the conscious or unconscious belief, which

derives from fear and resentment, that African Americans are inferior to whites. It is
manifested in society in various ways. See HORNE, supra note 242, at 33. For example,
white women have been the prime beneficiaries of Affirmative Action. Nevertheless, their

beneficence, as compared to that of African Americans, has remained extensively unchal-

1997]

BLIND LEADING THE COLORBLIND

"afrophobic" repercussions because it has tended to downplay the hardships

experienced by blacks relative to whites and to provide better protection to
white females than to blacks by using more lenient standards of judicial
review." 9
The consequence of this devastating cycle is an ultimate disparity where
acquiescent whites benefit from a "racial status quo" while blacks are
systemically and unwillfully excluded. As a result, racism may only, at least
for the present time, be ameliorated by group-based remedies.
2.

Need Not Causedby Inferioritybut Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Not only are African Americans faced with the negative socio-economic
effects of racism, but there are also profound psychological effects which
affect many blacks. The disparity in test scores between blacks and whites
is in all likelihood not an "intelligence" problem but is indicative of other
" ' A "self-fulfilling
factors.29
prophecy" is shared by many African Americans

lenged. See Lisa Anderson, Women Escape AffirmativeAction Feud, CHI. TaiB., May 16,
1995, at 1, 8; see also Konrad & Linnehan, supra note 256, at 16. In addition, blacks
disproportionately receive more criminal sentences than whites. See Louis Freedberg, New
Jump in Rate of Incarcerationfor Black Males, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995.
290. Justice Stevens, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, admonished the Court by
explaining that the effect of its approach in Adarand, that is, of abolishing the distinction
between benign and invidious discrimination, would result in the application of two standards
of review regarding benign discrimination. The first would be "intermediate scrutiny" to
gender discrimination. The second would concern a "strict scrutiny" approach to race
discrimination. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2122 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The resulting anomaly of this will be that the government can more easily
implement "affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women than it can
enact affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against African-Americans even though the primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination
against the former slaves") Id.
In addition, if a policy was designed to benefit women, the Court has adopted a
more lenient standard, the "fair and substantial relation" test, which then validated the policy.
See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevrin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). However, if a policy was implemented
to benefit males and which thus constituted a burden on females, the Court treated women
as a suspect class that therefore called for "close judicial scrutiny" which then invalidated the
policy. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03 (noting that gender classifications do not create
the same problems as those racially based). Justice Powell utilized this distinction to provide
his justification for using strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review in racial contexts.
Id. at 291, 299.
291. F. ALLAN HANSON, TESTING, TESTING: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXAMINED
LIFE, 266 (1993) [hereinafter TESTING, TESTING].
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which is the consequence of stereotypical rejection.292 The victims of the
self-fulfilling prophecy are those African Americans who believe society's
demeaning message, revealed both on an interpersonal level and through the
media, that blacks as a whole share certain self-perpetuating characteristics

which justify their lot. As a result, some African Americans respond to
racism by disassociating themselves from the group.293 The self-prophetic
belief is also displayed by the sense of hopelessness and despair caused by
pathological "ghettoization," the result of which is a large number of African
Americans who are forced to live in poor and dilapidated urban areas caused
by white prejudice and discrimination that restricts the residential mobility of
blacks and leaves them isolated from whites.294 This deters the availability

of black role models in that poor black, contrary to white children, are more
likely to live in social environments which are marked by joblessness, poor
295
schooling, and consequent expectations of poor scholastic performance.
Therefore affirmative action provides an effective means of providing role
models for those who feel or are destined to feel a lost sense of hope to

achieve.
3.

An "Emerging"Protected Class?

The current judicial posture detracts the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment by essentially protecting whites as a group. While African
Americans have faced extremely difficult obstacles in judicially challenging
alleged racist practices, presently whites do not bear such a burden.2 96 The
292. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 286, at 115, 162-64. Racial isolation has caused
self-defeating attitudes among inner city blacks that no matter what they do they will never
be accepted by society. Id. at 183. This in turn perpetuates low achievement. Id. at 164.
293. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring);
see also Thomas E. Hanson, Note, Rising Above the Past:AffirmativeAction as a Necessary
Means of Raising the Black Standard of Living as Well as Self-Esteem, 16 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 107, 124-26 (1996) [hereinafter Hanson, RisingAbove the Past]. For example,
many blacks refuse to hire people from their own race to perform services for them. Id. at
124. This perpetuates an unjust impression that whites are superior to blacks in providing
services. Id. at 125.
294. HIGGINBOTHAM, supranote 8, at 126; MASSEY & DENTON, supranote 286, at 15053.
295. NIEMAN, supra note 2, at 209; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 286, at 166.
296. The school desegregation cases have always required either evidence of dejure
segregation or intentional, invidious segregation despite racially neutral policies to effectuate
race-based remedial decrees. See supra Part I.B. The intent element has also been required
in areas other than education. See, e:g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); cf. supra Part II.B (where whites need not demonstrate intentional discrimination to prevail). Instead, it suffices to show that an affirmative
action program based on race exists which thus calls for application of strict scrutiny test, a
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effect of this is that although the Fourteenth Amendment was enforced to
assist blacks, whites will now be treated as a protected class.297 Therefore,
the advantages whites already experience will be enhanced by the elimination
of race-based programs. Although some contend that the "plain meaning" of
the Fourteenth Amendment bars racial remedies in the absence of constitutional violations, the effect of this interpretation runs afoul of the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the intent should predominate and racial
remedies must thrive.2 98
4.

Diversity as a Justificationfor Race-Based Remedies

Race-based programs involve the quest of not just eliminating discrimination and its effects on African Americans, but they also promote diversity
which benefits persons of all races. Through attempts to vary the ethnic
composition of, for example, student bodies and businesses, the barriers of
racial prejudice and misunderstandings may crumble. 9 9 In addition, it
enables university students to gain exposure to varying perspectives."'
Efforts to diversify additionally make good sense in that they help businesses
to succeed 30 ' and are fundamentally needed to meet the challenges of the
21st century.30 2 Since diversification undoubtedly provides enriching

very hard test to pass). It therefore seems easier for a white plaintiff to prevail in a
discrimination suit than a black complainant. This contradicts the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment by placing a greater legal burden on blacks than whites even though blacks have
been the group meant to be protected.
297. See Jones, The HarlanDissent, supra note 235, at 970 (noting that courts are using
"heightened standards of proof to invalidate blacks' group expectations in favor of whites'
individual expectations").
298. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 340 (Brennan., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that no rule of law prohibits the employment of aids to decipher the statutory
meaning of words, especially when "plain meaning" conflicts with Congress' expressed
legislative purpose).
299. Cf Race, Law, and Justice, supra note 225, at 597.
300. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14.
301. See Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P. Ferris, SeparatingMyth From Reality: An
Economic Analysis of Voluntary AffirmativeAction Programs, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV.

773, 781 (1993) (explaining that some companies assert Affirmative Action and the

promotion of diversity enhances profitability and efficiency). Such programs also have a
positive effect on financial markets. Id. at 793-95.
302. Projections forecast that blacks and other minorities will constitute almost 40

percent of the American workforce by the year 2000. See Julius L. Chambers, Brown v.
Boardof Education,in RACE IN AMERICA 184, 187 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr., eds.,
1993). Furthermore, by 2010, Hispanics will become the largest minority. Tom Morganthau,
What Color is Black?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 64.
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experiences for persons of all races, it provides further reason for maintaining
race-conscious plans.
5.

The Inadequacy of Race-NeutralAlternatives and
Other Means of Recourse

As an initial alternative to race-based programs, some of those who
censure affirmative action propose the implementation of class-based efforts.
Supposedly, this substitution will curb resentful feelings and disproportionately advantage blacks. a3 Nevertheless, this may very well not be the
result. The disparities in test scores is racial, not class, identified3 °4 and
have been considered racially biased.0 5 Since this is the case the situation
becomes problematic when, for example, blacks and whites are similarly
economically situated and competing to achieve the same goal. The
combined effect of this will still be a disproportionate advantage for whites
as test scores will still be a factor considered in determining merit. Even if
blacks were to incur a greater benefit from class-conscious remedies than
whites, whites will probably still complain about reverse discrimination,
precisely because the final effect is to advantage blacks. Moreover, class was
not meant to be included in affirmative action programs.30 6
A second suggested option is to broaden the racially subjective concept
of meritocracy beyond test scores and grades in order to improve the chances
of blacks to obtain success. However, thus far society appears to hold
steadfast to traditional meritocracy, even though achievement is dictated by
factors other than grades and test scores. 0 7
A final option is that concerned citizens should petition their legislatures
if they dislike the Supreme Court's requirement of constitutional or statutory
violations to validate race-based programs.30 8 Those who champion this
idea are, however, idealistic. The advent of Shaw will make minority
representation more difficult to effectuate and could essentially stifle the
voices of African Americans who wish to further the goal of racial

303. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
304. TESTING, TESTING, supra note 291 at 259.
305. TESTING, TESTING, supra note 291, at 266 (finding that the greater the interaction
with the ethnic group which creates the tests, the better the scores of the takers). Hanson also

suggests that tests may be a very effective method for excluding minorities. Id. at 260.
306. Morton, supra note 229, at 1123-25.
307. TESTING, TESTING, supra note 291, at 276. See also HORNE, supra note 242, at
3.
308. Justice O'Connor is one such advocate. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
2060, 2061 (1995).
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progress.30 9 Additionally, restricting redress to legislatures ignores the
remedial and momentous role the judiciary has historically played in
executing the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.3"'
In sum, class-based remedies will not assuredly provide equal opportunities to African Americans, society is unwilling to expand traditional precepts
of merit, and legislatures may not effectively compensate for pervasive
racism. Accordingly, these alternatives are insufficient and there is thus the
necessity to maintain race-conscious affirmative action programs, particularly
in higher education.
IV. RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL APPROACH
Education is inarguably the foundation for success in life.3 ' It is
therefore critical that African Americans and other minorities have opportunities to obtain educational benefits. Societal racism against African Americans
continues to present obstinate socio-economic and psychological barriers to
achieving access to higher education. It is exacerbated by interminable
stereotypes which prevent many blacks from receiving a foundation necessary
to acquire the requisite test scores for some university admissions procedures.
Blacks are thus frequently inhibited from reaching their full potential.312
This problem could forthrightly be solved if serious efforts were made
to eliminate de facto housing and school segregation, to provide more jobs
through community investment, preferably by financially successful African
Americans3" 3 who could serve as role models, and to generally uplift racial

309. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 680 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that "as long as
racial bloc voting takes place, meaning the practice of voters of the same race to vote for
like-candidates, legislatures will have to take race into account to avoid dilution of minority
voting strength ......
). Race-conscious redistricting has provided opportunities for
minorities to participate in the electoral process. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 135, 139 (1994).
Moreover, the chances that black congressional candidates will get elected in districts in
which African Americans make up less than 40 percent of the population are slim. This is
because a racial group is likely to believe that representatives from its own group will
represent the interests of members of that group. Peterson, supra note 282, at 14.
310. See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown I, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Swann,

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
311. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
312. Blacks generally receive lower standardized test scores than whites. TESTING,
TESTING, supra note 291, at 260-61.

313. See Hanson, RisingAbove the Past, supranote 293, at 129 (discussing the positive
influence African Americans may exert on populations); see also Peter Annin, supra note
270, at 26.
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self-esteem." 4 Unfortunately, changes often occur slowly and they are
difficult to carry out when programs designed to achieve them are grossly
underfunded3" 5 and citizens resist school desegregation efforts." 6
As such, the Supreme Court must acknowledge the persistence of racism
when the day arrives during which it must examine the constitutionality of
race-conscious affirmative action in higher education. Additionally, the
Court should not forget that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to

protect African Americans from discrimination.3

7

Failing to remember

would be a ponderous mistake. The consequences could result in a
significant increase in resegregation of institutions of higher education.'
Supreme Court members have recognized the daunting and unique
position blacks have encountered due to racism." 9 Nonetheless, there are
other minority groups which undoubtedly experience discrimination.
Therefore, the Court ought to promulgate a "sliding scale" approach to
affirmative action programs in higher education.32 ° The more a particular
314. One excellent suggestion concerning raising self-esteem is to provide an
Afrocentric curriculum. This academic approach purports to improve self-esteem, confidence,
and to therefore ensure educational achievement by mainly focusing on the contributions of
Africans. See Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the AfrocentricCurriculum,101 YALE L.J. 1285,
1294 (1992).
315. Morton, supra note 229, at 1138.
316. Many individuals approve of school desegregation but oppose higher taxes and
busing. Orfield, supra note 53, at 238.
317. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating the "primary
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves").
Even Justice O'Connor noted this fact in Miller: ("[T]he driving force behind the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to end legal discrimination against blacks."
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2497 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
318. Amar & Katyal, supra note 243, at 1770 (concluding that overruling Bakke may
portend resegregation).
319. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). (indicating that blacks have
endured discrimination of more significance than any other racial group); see also Jenkins
111, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (providing a historic recount of "official
discrimination" suffered by African Americans); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400-01 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the experience of blacks has been
different than that of other ethnic groups); Frakt, supra note 252, at 19 n. 17.
320. Varying Affirmative Action plans according to the group concerned has been
suggested by at least one dean. See, e.g., Frakt, supra note 252, at 19-21.
A "sliding scale" method was advocated by Justice Marshall in his concurring
opinion in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230-31 (Marshall, J., concurring) (1982). This case
concerned the legality of a Texas law which withheld state funds from local school districts
which provided education to children of illegal aliens. The Court, while rejecting the
argument that illegal aliens are a "suspect class" that would otherwise call for "heightened
scrutiny," held that the children of illegal aliens are similar to a suspect class in that the law
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group resembles a "suspect class," the less stringent the applicable judicial
standard of review should be.3 2'
Affirmative action programs in higher education that benefit African
Americans should be evaluated under the "intermediate standard" of review
suggested by Justice Brennan in Bakke.322 Adopting the intermediate
standard would necessitate an "important governmental goal" and "substantially related means" of achieving it. 323 Important governmental goals may
include ending societal discrimination against blacks 324 and expanding
diversity, which honor First Amendment rights of academic freedom.3 25
Flexible numeric racial goals which are routinely adjusted as university
officials may see fit, may suffice as "substantially related" means.326

"imposes [a] discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children
have little control." Id. at 217-20 n. 19. These children are powerless to change their
societal status. Id. Additionally, the law threatened to deny the children an education which
is a highly important governmental function. Id. at 222. The Court thus adopted a "fair
relationship to a legitimate public purpose" test. Id. at 216. It subsequently found the law
was unconstitutional. Id. at 230.
African Americans as a class and relative to whites as a group, like children of
illegal aliens, are systematically denied power to alleviate the societal status assigned to them
by virtue of racial prejudice. Unlike the children, however, they are a suspect class. Thus,
policies which benefit blacks as a class should be accorded even more constitutional
protection than that provided to children of illegal aliens, especially in higher education.
321. Id.. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (approving the demonstrable wisdom of
employing differing levels of scrutiny).
322. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 396 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ending
discrimination should be of the "highest order").
325. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-15. A diverse student body provides an atmosphere of
"speculation, experience, and creation" which are "essential to the quality of higher
education." Id. at 312. This is a goal protected by the university's First Amendment right
of academic freedom. Id.
Diversity has also been recognized as a valid First Amendment interest pertaining
to the broadcasting industry. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990); see
also Amici Curiae in support of Respondent at 9, Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990) (No. 89-453). Adarandoverruled MetroBroadcasting,Inc., in that strict scrutiny, not
intermediate scrutiny as was applied in Metro Broadcasting,Inc., shall apply to federal
minority set-asides. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. However, it was silent regarding the
constitutionality of diversity as a goal.
The Court in both Bakke and Metro Broadcasting, Inc., demonstrate a marked
respect for policies which protect the First Amendment interest in exposure to diverse
viewpoints which may, as a result, benefit all racial groups.
326. In fact, a racial quota, which is more rigid, has been validated under an
intermediate scrutiny test. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Even if the Court opts to apply strict scrutiny to higher education,
affirmative action programs that are founded on race could pass the test.
First, diversity has been recognized as a compelling goal.327 Secondly, in
spite of the Court's disregard of the elimination of societal discrimination
which does not emanate from a constitutional violation as a compelling
interest, if it found that a "social emergency" or "lingering effects" derived
from racism existed, a compelling goal may be inferred. a28 If the Court
were to seriously contemplate the reality of education and housing segregation as it did in Brown I,329 perhaps it may discover the "lingering effects"
of discrimination and therefore provide justification for maintaining raceconscious admissions procedures in higher education.3s Failing to do so
may accelerate a historic revisitation to the days proceeding Brown I.
Employing flexible numeric goals also may be narrowly tailored to obtaining
these compelling goals because it is obvious they cannot be achieved without
adopting race-based methods. School officials, however, must take care that
the means used are not overinclusive nor underinclusive. In other words, if
diversity is the compelling goal, affirmative action plans would most likely
have to encompass neutral factors33 ' and thus officials should design
additional and appropriate non-racial schema to accomplish the goal.
Finally, the need for affirmative action programs based on race should
be determined by university admissions officials who have broad authority
to implement educational policy. This would constitute "academic freedom,"
and conforms to the principles enunciated in Bakke and are afforded First
Amendment protection.3 2 Similarly, this would conform to the principles
333
substantiated in Swann and Brown ."

327. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (reasoning that diversity is a compelling interest in the
tontext of higher education).
328. SeeAdarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (O'Connor, J.) (referring to "lingering effects,");
see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring). The current and sorry state of
affairs for many inner city African Americans may indeed constitute a "social emergency."
See Morton, supra note 229, at 1110 & n.96.
329. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 n.1l.
330. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
331. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (recognizing a permissible admissions program which
could "promote educational pluralism" as one that embraces consideration of other, nonracial, factors).
332. See supra note 326 and accompanying 'text.
333. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (determining that school officials possess extensive
power to formulate educational policy to, for instance, achieve pluralistic goals); see also
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299 ("[s]chool authorities have primary responsibility for ... solving
[local school] problems"). Furthermore, although Swann and Brown II did not concern the
higher education area, the Supreme Court has utilized Brown II and Swann as precedent to
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The Supreme Court must not condone nor succumb to the manifest
existence of racism by ignoring its effects, nor may the law give direct or
indirect effect to private biases. 34 If the Supreme Court chooses to ignore
the reality of racism, it will secure the disturbing impact of Shaw, Croson,
and Adarand and will resemble Plessy v. Ferguson.335 If and when the
Court confronts the issue of race-based remedies in higher education where
no constitutional violation is evident, it will have a choice. It may either take
another giant step backward336 and hasten the destruction of racial progress,
or it may choose to walk forward and salvage the vulnerable remains of
contemporary affirmative action programs which have been the foundation
for eradicating the effects of racism and have been the source of hope for
many.
CONCLUSION

Justice Blackmun stated that "In order to get beyond racism, we must
'
first take account of race."337
These words are unfortunately incontestable.
The threatening demise of affirmative action in higher education hangs over
its proponents like an ominous cloud. It is indisputable that the obliteration
of race-based remedial programs will only exacerbate the pestilent effects of
racism. Until more viable solutions are established which will seriously
combat racism, neighborhoods and schools will remain racially segregated
due to societal factors motivated by prejudice which will discourage racial
integration and further deny the opportunities of African Americans to obtain
the same foundations for success of which whites often take advantage.
Consequently, it is absolutely imperative that the Supreme Court considers
the need to adopt a judicial analysis which will, in effect, declare race-based
university admissions programs as generally constitutionally valid. This may
best be accomplished by utilizing an intermediate standard ofjudicial review.
The Supreme Court has already "constitutionalized its wishful think'
ing." 338
It must not also constitutionalize society's "racist thinking."
Instead, it should observe and utilize its judicial power to dispel the reality
that:

demonstrate that universities are not immune to their mandates. See United States v. Fordice,

505 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1992).

334. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
335. See supra notes 40, 139-41 and accompanying text.
336. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528-29 (1989) (Marshall,
J. dissenting).
337. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
338. Croson, 488 U.S. at 552-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"[T]he ashes of... hate" which originate from precepts of black
inferiority, "[lie] at the bottom of our memory. . . .[T]hey lie
uneasily, like a heavy secret which whites can never quite confess,
which blacks can never quite forgive, and which, for both blacks
and whites, forestalls until a distant day any hope of peace and
redemption. ' 39
AMY L. KNICKMEIER

339.

HIGGINBOTHAM, supra

note 8, at 17.

